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INTRODUCTION
Ambivalence toward the right to a jury trial in civil cases
has been a feature of our judicial system from the outset.' The
I See generally M. RADn,, HANDBOOK OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 131
(1936); Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HAxv. L. REv. 289
(1966); discussion infra notes 7-55 and accompanying text.
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jury has been hailed as the very essence of our freedom2 and
contemporaneously attacked as inept and "lawless. ' 3 Since the
origin of the jury, the common law has devised various ways of
controlling the power of that institution; currently, federal rules
of procedure embody many of these jury control devices. 4 Those
assessing the usefulness and constitutional validity of these pro-
cedural devices often have found them in conflict with the jury-
trial right. This apparent conflict results, at least in part, because
those assessing control devices have relied upon excessively nar-
row and incomplete theoretical models of the civil-jury-trial right.
Generally, these prior models describe and circumscribe a role
for the civil jury without giving adequate consideration to the
dynamics of a judge/jury system or without giving a convincing
justification for power allocation within that system. This Article
seeks to create a model that remedies these shortcomings.
Traditional models describing the role of the civil jury rest
primarily upon historical, legal, and political grounds. Historical
models define the jury's role under the seventh amendment's
mandate to follow common law practices. Legal models focus
on the law/fact distinction and limit the jury's role to consid-
eration of those matters defined as factual. Political models
emphasize the democratizing influence of juries in an otherwise
antimajoritarian judicial system and describe the necessity of
jury participation. While each of these models explains some
aspect of the jury's role, none of them systematically explores
the limits of what that role is or should be. Thus, they are not
useful in describing what and when jury control devices are
appropriate. This Article proposes a functional model that pro-
vides a basis for making such decisions.
Because the seventh amendment 5 compels preservation of the
jury-trial right as it existed at common law, 6 all civil jury models
have a historical component. Therefore, this Article begins with
See, e.g., Wilder, The Clown of the Law, 20 ALB. L.J. 45 (1879).
Scott, Should Trial by Jury in Civil Cases Be Abolished? 20 AM. L. REv 661
(1886). See generally Campbell, Some Hints on Defects in the Jury System, 4 S. L. REv
521 (1878).
4 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ P 49(a), 50, 59(a).
I See infra note 27 (text of amendment).
6 See infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
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a discussion of the civil-jury origins with the aim of later drawing
from that history to measure the current validity of various jury
control devices. Criticism of traditional models of the jury fol-
lows. Each model fails to explain existing jury practice or to
prescribe a future role for civil juries.
Due to inadequacies in existing models, a new theoretical
model is proposed-one dependent upon a functional analysis
of the respective roles of the judge and the jury Jury control
devices are assessed in relation to this new functional model,
supporting the thesis that the tension between the jury-trial right
and jury control devices is a consequence of the failure of
traditional models to clarify the appropriate allocation of deci-
sion making between judge and jury in our adjudicatory process.




Although details of its origins are obscure, scholarly consen-
sus is that the English jury, despite being perceived as democratic
and representative, derived from Frankish royal administrative
practices of the early ninth century 7 Brought to England by the
Norman conquest, the civil jury was originally an administrative
device for the government to obtain desired information . This
early use of the "jury," known as an inquisition, bore little
resemblance to the modern institution.9 Thayer has described
twelfth-century jury practice:
7 1 W HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 312-20 (7th ed. 1922); S.
MILSOM, HIsTroIucAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 11 (2d ed. 1981); M. RADiN,
supra note 1, at 126; J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON
LAW 85 (1898).
: J. THAYER, supra note 7, at 47-48.
During this earliest period there are many illustrations of the use of the
inquisition in ordinary administration. The conspicuous case is that of the
compilation of Domesday Book in 1085-6. This was accomplished by a
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When once the twelve knights have assembled ., it is first
ascertained by their oath whether any of them are ignorant of
the fact If there be any such, they are rejected and others
chosen. If the twelve differ in their verdict, others are added
until there are twelve who agree The knowledge required
of them is their own perception, or what their fathers have
told them, or what they may trust as fully as their own per-
ceptions 10
This notion-that the jury would make a decision based on the
knowledge of its members, rather than on the evidence presented
to it-was to persist for several centuries, well beyond the time
when juries routinely heard witnesses and were presented with
evidence." As late as 1670, in Bushell's Case, 2 the court reaf-
firmed the jury's independence in this regard. Although the jury
hears the evidence, it may "act upon evidence of which the court
knows nothing; and may rightfully decide a case without any
evidence publicly given for or against either party "13
With its continued existence confirmed by the Magna Carta,1 4
the jury became an embodiment of popular representation in
government.' This position was largely due to its role in eight-
eenth-century criminal tnals, in particular, criminal libel cases
that pitted political activists against a repressive government. 6
commission, making inquiry throughout England, by sworn men of each
neighborhood, responsible and acquainted with the facts. Domesday is a
record of all sorts of details relating to local customs, and the possession,
tenure, and taxable capacity of the land owners. Incidentally much
else came in, as where an inquest relates in its answers the proceedings of
a litigation in the popular court, and how, upon Ralph's failure to appear
on a day fixed by the sheriff, the men of the hundred had adjudged
the land to his adversary.
Id. at 51.
10 Id. at 62-63 (emphasis added).
11 M. RADIN, supra note I, at 129; J. THAYER, supra note 7, at 137.
11 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P 1670). Thayer viewed Vaughan's opinion in Bushell's
Case as an unfinished draft. J. THAYER, supra note 5, at 167 n.I.
" J. THAYER, supra note 7, at 168 (drawing a conclusion from the opinion in
Bushell's Case).
See td. at 66.
" See generally id. at 68.
16 The King v. Shipley, 99 Eng. Rep. 774 (K.B. 1784); The Case of Henry Sampson
Woodfall, 20 How. St. Tr. 895 (K.B. 1770); Trial of John Miller, 20 How. St. Tr. 870
(K.B. 1770); Trial of John Almon, 20 How. St. Tr. 803 (K.B. 1770); Trial of William
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These libel cases resulted in Fox's Libel Act of 1792, ensuring
the jury's right to return a general verdict in libel cases, thereby
effectively giving the jury power to nullify an unjust law 17
2. American
In the English historical context, the framers of the Umted
States Constitution cofisidered the right to a jury trial in civil
cases. 18 During the Constitutional Convention, the framers de-
voted very little debate to the civil jury trial. 9 Late in the
proceedings, the convention members discussed the judiciary
articles without mentiomng civil juries. 20 Three days after a final
draft reporting, the civil jury issue was considered on the Con-
vention floor for the first time. The framers rejected a motion
to amend Article III's guarantee of jury trial in criminal cases
to include the language: "And a trial by jury shall be preserved
as usual in civil cases. "21 The problem was not lack of support
for the notion of a right to jury trial;22 instead, the framers
failed to agree on the precise content of a guarantee.Y The
Owen, 18 How. St. Tr. 1203 (K.R. 1770); Trial of Mr. Richard Francklin, 17 How. St.
Tr. 625 (K.B. 1731); Dominus Rex v. Nutt, 94 Eng. Rep. 647 (K.B. 1728); Trial of the
Seven Bishops, 12 How. St. Tr. 183 (K.B. 1688).
17 32 Geo. 3, Ch. 60 (1792).
,1 For a comprehensive discussion of the colonial perspective on jury trials, see 4
C. ANDREWS, THE COLONIAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HIsToRY (1964); Henderson, supra
note 1; Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L.
REV 639 (1972-73).
19 THE REcoRis OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (M. Farrand ed. 1937)
[hereinafter Farrand]; Henderson, supra note 1, at 293.
J0 .MADISON, reprinted in DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, 2 Farrand,
supra note 19, at 587.
11 Id. at 628.
22 For example, Alexander Hamilton wrote:
The friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention if they agree in
nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by jury;
or if there is any difference between them, it consists in this: the former
regard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty, the latter represent it as the
very palladium of free government.
THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 382 (A. Hamilton) (Hallowell ed. 1852).
2 Henderson suggested that the reason the framers did not include a civil jury
guarantee in the Constitution was "at least in part that the convention members simply
wanted to go home. They had worked hard through a hot, steamy Philadelphia summer
on the more difficult and more central problems of representation in Congress and
choice of a national executive, and they had had enough." Henderson, supra note 1, at
294-95.
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practice of civil jury trial was well established in the American
colonies but varied greatly in scope and application. 24
The failure to include a civil-jury-trial guarantee in the Con-
stitution was one of the major objections raised by the docu-
ment's opponents. 2 Many viewed the failure to provide for the
jury trial as a move to abolish it.26 These objections (along with
others expressed in the ratification process) resulted in the adop-
tion of the Bill of Rights, including the seventh amendment.
27
Essentially, no legislative history regarding the seventh amend-
ment exists. House debate focused not on the content of the
amendment but rather on whether amending the Constitution at
all, or so soon after ratification, was advisable.
28
The final form of the seventh amendment "preserved" the
right to jury-trials "according to the rules of the common law "29
24 See P FORD, PAmPHLETS ON THE CO NSTITUTION, reprinted in 3 Farrand, supra
note 19, at 101, for James Wilson's speech defending the failure to include a civil-jury-
trial guarantee:
The cases open to a jury, differed in the different states; it was therefore
impracticable, on that ground, to have made a general rule. The want of
uniformity would have rendered any reference to the practice of the states
idle and useless: and it could not, with any propriety, be said, that 'the
trial by jury shall be as heretofore:' since there has never existed any
federal [sic] system of jurisprudence, to which the declaration could relate.
Id.
See, e.g., DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONVENTION OF THE COMMON-
WEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 80 (1856). Several states including Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New York, Virginia, and Rhode Island included recommendations for a
civil jury guarantee in their motions for ratification. 1 J. EiLTor, TE DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATES CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONsTITUoN 326 (2d
ed. 1986); 3 id. at 658; Henderson, supra note 1, at 298.
26 See Henderson, supra note 1, at 296-97, quoting a speech by "A Democratic
Federalist" reprinted in PENNSYLVANIA AND Tm FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 152-53 (J.
McMaster & F Stone ed. 1888) ("I am therefore right in my assertion, that trial by
jury in civil cases is by the proposed Constitution entirely done away and effectually
abolished.").
21 The seventh amendment provides:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law.
U.S. CO ST. amend. VII.
28 Senate proceedings were not made public at that time. Henderson, supra note
1, at 292. See also, the preamble to the joint resolution submitting the Bill of Rights to
the states, 1 Stat. 97 (1789), which reflects Congress' wish to reassure the minority who
opposed the Constitution that their civil liberties would be protected.
" U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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Because the amendment refers to the practices of the common
law, the Supreme Court initially took a historical approach in
interpreting the seventh amendment:
By common law, [the framers] meant suits in which legal
rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinc-
tion to those where equitable rights alone were recogmzed, and
equitable remedies were administered. Probably there were
few, if any, states in the union, in which some new legal
remedies differing from the old common law forms were not
in use; but in which, however, the trial by jury intervened,
and the general regulations in other respects were according to
the course of the common law In a just sense, the amend-
ment then may well be construed to embrace all suits which
are not of equity and admiralty jurisdiction, whatever may be
the peculiar form which they may assume to settle legal rights.30
The court left for a much later day the question whether the
framers envisioned the common law as an evolving process or
as a rigid historical context. 31 The historical test, as described
by Justice Story above, was to define the outer boundaries of
the civil-jury-trial right until well into the twentieth century
B. Nineteenth-Century Development
The public perception of the jury as a popular, democratic
institution reached a highwater mark during the first half of the
nineteenth century, corresponding, some suggest, to the rise of
Jacksonian democracy 32 Although Coke's maxim was often cited,
ad quaestionem facti non respondent judices [judges do not
answer a question of fact] ad quaestionem jurs non re-
spondent juratores [juries do not answer a question of law],33
30 Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830).
31 For a discussion of the Beacon Theatres case and subsequent case law, see infra
notes 60-71 and accompanying text.
32 Comment, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE
L.J. 170 (1964). But cf. M. HoRwiTz, Tm TRSA~sroiATioN oF AmEiucMJ LAW 1780-
1860 28-29 (1977) in which the author posits an earlier beginning to the shift of power
from juries to judges. This late eighteenth-century diminishment of jury power is attrib-
uted to a growing delegation of legislative function to judges and the movement away
from the "natural law" concept.
1, E. CoKz, COmMENTARY ON LrILETON § 234 (15th ed. 1794).
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the practices of the early nineteenth century did not correspond
to an allocation of fact-finding functions to the jury and law-
finding functions to the judge.
[I]n the several states the power of the judge became more and
more restricted in the era that accompanied the rise of Andrew
Jackson and the reorganized Democratic Party with the
emphasis shifting more and more to the jury In many juris-
dictions, judges were prevented from commenting on the evi-
dence.3
4
This emphasis upon the jury as a safeguard against abuse of
government power was consistent with the prevailing political
philosophy of the colonial period, a philosophy that rested upon
popular control over and participation in government. Thomas
Jefferson wrote that "it is necessary to introduce the people into
every department of government, as far as they are capable of
exercising it; and that this is the only way to insure a long-
continued and honest admimstration of its powers. ' 35 Moreover,
many people distrusted crown-appointed colonial judges and
believed that the jury curbed the unbridled exercise of royal
power.
36
Two developments characterized the eighteenth and early
nineteenth century shift of power away from judges and toward
juries. First, many states forbade judges from commenting on
the evidence in the process of instructing juries.37 This practice-
contrary to both English common law and that used in federal
courts-continues in most jurisdictions today 31 Second, courts
and commentators acknowledged the jury's right as well as its
power to decide the law in a case.
39
Even the Supreme Court in an early case within its original
jurisdiction, in which it empaneled a jury, expressly allowed the
jury to decide the law as well as the facts of the case:
M. RADiN, supra note 1, at 217.
3 THE WRMNos OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 81 (H. Washington ed. 1853).
36 4 C. ANDREws, supra note 18, at 225; R. POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA
115 (2d ed. 1945); R. POUND, TiE FoRMATvE ERA IN AMERICAN LAW 91-92 (1938).
, Comment, supra note 32, at 170 (quoting M. RADIN, supra note 1, at 217).
"By 1926, 38 states had prohibited the judge from commenting on the evidence."
Id. at 173 n.20 (citing Hogan, The Strangled Judge, 14 J. AM. JuD. Soc'y 119-20 nn.18-
20 (1930)).
11 Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARv L. REv 582 (1939).
1987-88]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
It may not be amiss, here, Gentlemen, to remind you of the
good old rule, that on questions of fact, it is the province of
the jury, on questions of law, it is the province of the court
to decide. But it must be observed, that by the same law,
which recogmzes this reasonable distribution of jurisdiction,
you have nevertheless a right to take upon yourselves to judge
of both, and to determine the law as well as the fact in
controversy 40
The state courts accepted this view also. By reference to English
common law and to criminal libel actions in particular, 4 this
view is consistent with the views expressed by the drafters of the
Constitution. 42 At some point the pendulum began to swing
back. The Supreme Court reversed itself in 1895 by holding that
even in crimunal cases the jury must apply the law as given by
the judge to the facts it finds.
43
Roscoe Pound characterized the period from independence
to the end of the Civil War as the formative era of American
law 44 During this era, courts evolved from a position of public
distrust, with many nonlawyer judges on the bench, to thd point
at which "reported judicial experience became the decisive agency
of lawmaking." ' 45 Judicial decision making also moved away
from the influence of the natural law toward a more analytical
or historical theory 46 By the latter part of the mneteenth century,
[j]urists thought of law as the imperative of the state, applied
mechanically by tribunals in the adnumstration of justice, or
as a body of traditional legal precepts by which the state
permitted causes to be adjudicated for the time being in the
absence of its imperatives, or as a body of formulations of
,0 Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 4 (1794).
4' See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
4 John Adams, although not a drafter of the Constitution, took the position that
with respect to the "general rules of law and common regulations of society," a juror
should not be compelled to accept the judge's view, but rather "[i]t is not only his right,
but his duty, in that case, to find the verdict according to his own best understanding,
judgment, and conscience, though in direct opposition to the direction of the court." 2
Tm WoRKs OF JOHN ADAms 254, 255 (C. Adams ed. 1850).
41 Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 102 (1895).
" R. POUND, THi FORmATVE ERA iN AmRcCAN LAW, supra note 36, at 3.
" Id. at 93; see also M. HORwiTZ, supra note 32.
46 R. POUND, Tim FoalATIvE ERA iN AMERICAN LAW supra note 36, at 110.
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experience of human conduct, and of experience of human
admimstration of justice, the umversal governing principles of
which were to be discovered by historical inquiry 47
Given the judiciary's increased professionalism and the new
emphasis in legal philosophy upon the analytical and historical,
it is not surprising that by the end of the nineteenth century the
jury was coming under increasing attack.48 Procedural changes
that appeared to coincide with this diminished view of the jury
included the evolution of the rules of evidence, the development
of the judicial notice doctrine, the growing distinction between
questions of fact and questions of law, and the development of
the special verdict and special interrogatory devices .49 One late
nineteenth-century commentator found the "diminished influ-
ence and power of juries in England and the United States-
especially in the Federal Courts- is clearly illustrated by the
force and language used and expressed in instructions to the
jury ",50
Key to the division of responsibilities between judge and jury
was the evolving distinction between law and fact. As Coke's
maxim would indicate, this distinction was well known at com-
mon law and it was also acknowledged in the language of the
seventh amendment. However, during the course of the nine-
teenth century "[a]n attempt was made to sharpen the law-fact
dichotomy and give it concrete institutional expression."'" As
the jury's "right" to decide questions of law was called into
question, the continued proscription on the judge's ability to
comment on the evidence was a further reinforcement of the
allocation of responsibility- the judge would not be allowed to
intrude upon the jury's function, nor the jury upon the judge's. 52
This sharpening of the distinction between law and fact
corresponded with the widespread adoption of the Field Code
of Procedure, with its pleading requirement of a "statement of
47 Id.
11 See Comment, supra note 32, at 190-92.
4 See generally id. at 173.
Cocke, Jury Trial-Charging the Jury, 5 VA. L.J. 279, 281-82 (1881). See
generally Scott, supra note 3 at 666; Wilder, supra note 2, at 47.




the facts constituting the cause of action." ' 53 This seemingly
straightforward requirement resulted in considerable litigation
over whether a given issue concerned a matter of fact versus a
conclusion of law, or an evidentiary as opposed to an ultimate
fact. 54 Such distinctions necessarily carried over into the debate
on whether a matter was appropriate for jury decision: facts
certainly were, law presumably was not, and questions of mixed
law and fact were anyone's guess.W5
C. Right to Jury Trial
Criticism of the civil jury continued into the twentieth cen-
tury 56 Dissatisfaction with the jury as a fact-finding body and
as a part of the adjudicatory process grew 17 Some people sug-
gested abolishing the jury trial in civil cases or, at the very least,
strictly controlling the jury through procedural devices. 5 Despite
this criticism, the civil-jury-trial right remained intact and ar-
guably expanded;59 however, the critics were vindicated by the
continued acceptance of jury control devices. Detailed discussion
of those control devices necessitates a brief inquiry into the
current scope of the jury-trial right.
The line of Supreme Court decisions beginning with Beacon
Theatres, Inc. v Westover6° and Dairy Queen v Wood6l cur-
rently defines the scope of the civil-jury-trial right. In those
cases, the Court opted for a jury-trial right that is not tied so
tightly to the specifics of historical conditions. While acknowl-
edging the seventh amendment's reference to the common law,
the Court stated a rule that depended less upon divisions between
" N.Y. Laws (1848), ch. 379 § 120(2) (Amended in 1851 to read: "A plain and
concise statement of the facts constituting a cause of action ").
See, e.g., Gillispie v. Goodyear Serv. Stores, 128 S.E.2d 762 (N.C. 1963); Shives
v. Sample, 79 S.E.2d 193 (N.C. f953); McCaughey v. Schuette, 48 P 1088 (Cal. 1897).
" See generally C. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 38, at
228 (2d ed. 1947).
56 See, e.g., Scott, Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure, 31 HAIv. L.
REv 669 (1918); Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special, 29 YALE L.J. 253 (1920).
, See, e.g., Scott, supra note 56; Sunderland, supra note 56.
" See, e.g., Sunderland, supra note 56.
9 See infra notes 60-71 and accompanying text.
359 U.S. 500 (1959).
6, 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
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law and equity and more upon underlying historical bases for
equitable relief-irreparable harm and inadequacy of legal rem-
edy 62 If, by virtue of modern procedural rules, an adequate
remedy exists at law, a jury trial is mandated in that
proceeding 63-even if the proceeding (for example, an account-
ing) was heard traditionally in equity 64 Moreover, Beacon The-
atres rejected the equitable clean-up doctrine which permitted an
equity court hearing a case involving legal issues to decide those
issues without empaneling a jury; the Court held that when legal
and equitable issues necessitate overlapping factual determina-
tions, the legal issues are decided first and are accorded a jury
trial.65 Such a rule "applies whether the trial judge chooses to
characterize the legal issues presented as 'incidental' to equitable
issues or not." 66
Beacon Theatres and subsequent cases expanded the jury-
trial right to issues traditionally not afforded a jury and allowed
jury trials in the context of procedural devices (for example,
class actions and interpleader) that were developed by and existed
only in the equity courts. 67 The Supreme Court has excepted
from the broad jury-trial right only the situation in which ar-
guably legal issues arise in the context of "a specific statutory
scheme contemplating the prompt trial of a disputed claim with-
out the intervention of a jury ",68 The Court's last major state-
ment on the jury-trial right is contained in a 1970 case, Ross v
Bernhard,69 and more specifically in an enigmatic footnote. This
footnote provides: "As our cases indicate, the 'legal' nature of
' Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 506-07.
11 Id. at 508-09.
61 Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. at 477-78.
The respondents' contention that this money claim is "purely equitable"
is based primarily upon the fact that their complaint is cast in terms of an
"accounting," rather than in terms of an action for "debt" or "damages."
But the constitutional right to trial by jury cannot be made to depend
upon the choice of words used in the pleadings.
Id.
" Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 508.
Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. at 473.
67 See, e.g., Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970) (jury-trial right extends to stock-
holder's derivative suit).
61 Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 339 (1966).
69 Ross, 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
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an issue is determined by considering, first, the pre-merger cus-
tom with reference to such questions; second, the remedy sought;
and, third, the practical abilities and limitations of juries."' 70 At
least one commentator concludes that the Court's approach in-
dicates a movement away from an historical test- and toward a
truly "functional jury trial test."'7
Some lower federal courts have suggested another limitation
on the jury-trial right based upon the third consideration in the
Ross footnote. 72 This is the complexity exception which precludes
the use of a jury trial when complexity of issues, technological
sophistication of the evidence, numbers of parties, or difficulty
of the substantive law indicate that the "practical abilities" of
the jury do not allow for rational decision making. 73 Courts
justify the complexity exception with three arguments. First, the
historical argument is that the common law in 1791 recognized
such an exception. 74 Second, it is argued that, because of the
difficulties of decision making in these complex cases, they are
better left to the knowledge and experience of the judge.75 Fi-
nally, a due process argument contends that submitting a case
to the jury that exceeds its capacity for rational decision making
violates the litigants' due process rights. 76 The Supreme Court
has not addressed the complexity exception directly
10 Id. at 538 n.10.
71 Kane, Civil Jury Trial: The Case for Reasoned Iconoclasm, 28 HASTINGS L.J.
1, 11 (1976). But cf. Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the
Irrationality of Rational Decision Making, 70 Nw U.L. Rav 486, 530 (1975) ("Only
by clearly rejecting the limits imposed by the rational approach and openly adopting a
rigid historical approach in all cases will the courts be fulfilling their obligation to
provide a reasoned, generalizable interpretation of the seventh amendment right.").
7' See, e.g., In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir.
1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 471 U.S.
1002 (1985). But cf. In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980) (complexity exception rejected).
71 See Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d at 1079.
7, See Arnold, A Historical Inquiry Into the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex
Civil Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REv 829 (1980); Campbell & Le Poidevin, Complex
Cases and Jury Trials: A Reply to Professor Arnold, 128 U. PA. L. REv 965 (1980);
Arnold, A Modest Replication to a Lengthy Discourse, 128 U. PA. L. Rav 986 (1980).
7. See United States Fin. Secs. Litig., 75 F.R.D. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd, 609
F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979).
76 See Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d at 1084 (The third circuit
held that if a court determines that a jury cannot reach a rational decision because of
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II. MODERN IMPLEMENTATION BY PROCEDURAL DEVICES
77
Jury control devices are as old as the jury itself. Some, such
as the attaint, no longer exist; others evolved and continue in
use. What these devices have in common is not a shared history
or even a shared theoretical imperative; rather, each device de-
veloped in response to certain practical exigencies of jury prac-
tice. The discussion below describes the origins of these control
devices, their current use, and constitutional questions that the
devices raise. Examination of these devices is undertaken to
expose the inadequacies of traditional theoretical models and to
lay the groundwork for discussing a more functional approach
to allocation of decision making between the judge and the jury
A. Special Verdicts
1. History
The special verdict evolved to protect the jury from penalties
of attaint.78 Because early jurors in England were chosen by
virtue of their knowledge of the facts and circumstances, and
because evidence was not presented, the determination that the
jury had reached a false conclusion subjected it to punishment.
79
The practice of attaint apparently preceded the notion that the
court could set aside the jury's verdict. Instead, the losing party
could request that a second, larger jury, made up of members
of a higher social rank than the original jury, hear the case. 0
Other methods of attaint existed: jurors might be attainted upon
the complexity of the case, fifth amendment due process and seventh amendment right
to jury tnal concerns should be balanced.); see also Culley, In Defense of Civil Juries,
35 ME. L. REv. 17 (1983).
The following discussion does not include all possible procedural devices which
control the jury's function. For example, summary judgments and dismissals under
Federal Rules 56 and 41 are not explored. The devices in this section are representative
of types and rationales of jury control.
" See, e.g., J. THAYER, supra note 7, at 154; Henderson, supra note 1, at 307;
James, Sufficiency of the Evidence and Jury-Control Devices Available Before Verdict,
47 VA. L. Rsv. 218, 242 (1961); Note, Special Verdicts: Rule 49 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 74 YALE L.J. 483, 484 (1965).
9 J. THAYER, supra note 7, at 137-82.
w See, e.g., id. at 140.
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their own answers on later examination, or, upon confession of
the party in whose favor they found, that the verdict was false."1
Serious fines and even imprisonment were possible if the original
jury was found to have rendered a false verdict.
82
In order to protect itself from the attaint, particularly as law
grew more complex and subtle, the jury developed the practice
of submitting findings of fact to the judge who applied the law
to those facts. 83 By the time of enactment of the Statute of
Westminster 84 in 1285 which gave juries the pernussion to find
special verdicts, the statute was said to be only declaratory of
common law 85 The writ of attaint was abolished by statute in
1825, but by then it had long been obsolete, and the special
verdict was firmly in place in the English common law 16
Despite its origins as a self-protective device for jurors, "the
practice books of the eighteenth century make it clear that by
that time a special verdict was usually moved for and largely
drawn up by counsel. ' 8 7 Counsel consulted and agreed upon
questions to submit. Under the usual practice, the jurors con-
sulted, then gave their answers to the judge privately The next
day the tentative verdict was read in open court and lawyers
could object. When counsel agreed, the jurors were asked if this
81 Id.
82 Id. at 151; see Morgan, A Brief History of Special Verdicts and Special Inter-
rogatories, 32 YALE L.J. 575, 576 (1923).
11 Morgan, supra note 82, at 577-80. Morgan describes five forms of the "special
verdict" that existed at the end of the twelfth century and during most of the thirteenth
century:
(1) Direct answers followed by a statement of facts as reasons for the
answers.
(2) A statement of facts followed by direct answers to the questions
as conclusions from the statement.
(3) A statement of facts followed by the conclusion that they cannot
answer the question put.
(4) A statement of facts without any reference to a direct answer to
the questions submitted.
(5) A statement of facts with the request that the judges draw there-
from the conclusions which should constitute answers to the questions put.
Id. at 577-80.
13 Edw., ch.30.
See generally J. THAYER, supra note 7.
, See, e.g., id. at 154; Finz, Does the Trend in Our Substantive Law Dictate an
Expanded Use of the Special Verdict? 37 ALB. L. REv 229, 239 (1973).
87 Henderson, supra note 1, at 307
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was their verdict. If they agreed, then the final verdict was
entered .
88
Less clear than the origins of the special verdict is whether
a court could coerce a jury to return a special verdict, or whether
the choice of the verdict form rested solely with the jurors.8 9
The early evidence on this point is scant. ° While instances exist
in which the judge demanded a special verdict and the jury
complied, or in which the judge demanded a special verdict, the
jury refused, and the judge did not press the demand, neither
occurrence demonstrates conclusively that the jury could or could
not be compelled to return a special verdict. 91
In the ordinary civil case, the jury complied with a request
for a special verdict with rare exception. 92 In the few cases in
which it refused to comply, the authority is less than clear. In
an anonymous 1697 case, Lord Holt stated:
In all cases and in all actions the jury may give a general or
special verdict, as well in causes criminal as civil, and the
Court ought to receive it, if pertinent to the point in issue, for
if the jury doubt they may refer themselves to the Court, but
they are not bound so to do.
93
In other cases in the same period, however, the contrary is true.
94
Lord Holt only five years later, in a case in which the jury
" See Henderson, supra note 1, at 307 (citing 1 G. CROMPTON, THE PRACTICE OF
THE COURTS OF KING'S BENCH AND COMMON PLEAs 472-74 (B. Sellor 1st Am. ed. 1813);
2 J. LILLY, THE PRACTICAL REGISTER: OR A GENERAL ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW 791C
(2d ed. 1735); 2 W TIDD, THE PRACTICE OF THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH 808 (4th Am.
ed. 1856)).
See generally Henderson, supra note 1, at 307-09; Morgan, supra note 82, at
589.
See generally Henderson, supra note 1, at 307-09; Morgan, supra note 82, at
589.
Compare Gay v. Cross, 87 Eng. Rep. 1078 (K.B. 1702) (denying a new trial
although jury had refused to state reasons for its verdict) with The Queen v. Bewdley,
24 Eng. Rep. 357 (ch. 1712) (granting a new trial because jury used general verdict when
directed to use special verdict); Mayor and Burgesses of Devizes v. Clark, 111 Eng. Rep.
506 (K.B. 1835) (holding that jury has pnvilege to decline special verdict); Baker's Case,
77 Eng. Rep. 216 (K.B. 1600) (allowing jury to decide question of law by "special
matter").
91 Henderson, supra note 1, at 307.
91 91 Eng. Rep. 881 (K.B. 1697).
94 See, e.g., Pocklington v. Hatton, 88 Eng. Rep. 158 (K.B. 1724); Bewdley, 24
Eng. Rep. at 357.
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returned a general verdict when a special verdict was requested,
proclaimed that "he never had known the like, and that he
would have but little value for the verdict of a jury that would
not, at a Judge's desire, declare the reason which had induced
them. "95 Nevertheless, he refused to set the verdict aside.96
No cases on point are available later than the eighteenth
century, although some references to the earlier cases are made
in the writings of that period. 97 Lilly's Abridgement of 1735 does
not contain the early cases; instead, it states: "Although the
Plaintiff and the Defendant do consent to have the Jury find a
Special Verdict, yet they may find a General Verdict. But
it is a very unusual [t]hing for them to do it." 9
Commentators agree that justices attempted to compel a
special verdict only in rare cases. 99 Perhaps contributing to this
practice was the apparently common practice of interrogating
the jurors post verdict as to the reasons for their decisions.100 In
any event, the major writings on eighteenth-century courts do
not reveal any references to the jury's noncompliance with a
special verdict request as a ground for a new trial.101 Therefore,
compelling the jury to use a particular form of verdict apparently
was not an accepted practice. 102
95 Gay, 87 Eng. Rep. at 1078.
96 Id.
Henderson, supra note 1, at 308.
" Id. at 308-09 (quoting J. LLLY, supra note 88, at 793E).
See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 1, at 309.
One could speculate that the bar as a whole decided that these cases were
not good law, or that no jury in a civil case ever again refused to find a
special verdict. But perhaps the least unlikely guess would be that because
of the criminal libel cases of the period, a motion for a new trial on this
ground became so politically unpopular that practitioners considered it a
great tactical mistake.
Id.
100 See Morgan, supra note 82, at 591.
101 "Neither Blackstone's Commentaries (1768), Buller's Law of Nisi Prius (1785),
Tidd's Practice of the Court of King's Bench (1785), nor Chitty's Practice of the Law
(1842) mention this as a possible ground for a new trial." Henderson, supra note 1, at
309.
102 Henderson and Morgan draw this conclusion although Henderson finds the
evidence more ambiguous and the conclusion less clear. Id., Morgan, supra note 82, at
592.
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In this country, at the time the federal Constitution was
drafted, the special verdict was in use in all of the states for
which records are available'03 except Georgia, which had a con-
stitutional provision prohibiting the device. 14 The form of the
device seems to have varied from state to state. 105 Some early
cases demonstrate that the American and English practices were
very similar- counsel prepared the special verdict and the jury
was not free to depart materially from the special verdict form
as drawn up by the lawyers. 106 In at least one early case, a court
raised, but did not rule upon, the issue of whether the jury
could be compelled to bring in a special verdict. 1 7
As a consequence of the scant debate surrounding adoption
of the seventh amendment,'08 apparently the framers did not
consider details, such as the issue of the special verdict, as a
part of the right-to-jury-trial issue. Neither did the framers con-
sider the allocation of decision-making responsibility between
the judge and jury, "[n]or can any implicit understanding as to
this relationship be presumed, for among the thirteen original
states there were at least half a dozen widely differing patterns
of civil practice. ,,19 The federal courts, prior to the adop-
tion of the seventh amendment, were governed by the Judiciary
Act of 1789, under which issues of fact were triable by the jury
except in cases of admiralty and equity 1l0
As the nineteenth-century debate over the jury continued,
the advisability of unchecked jury decision making in the form
10 Brown v. Cornwell, I Root 60 (Conn. 1773); Wright's Lessee v. Cannon, 1 Del.
Cas. 42 (Del. 1794); Hath's Lessee v. Polk, I H. & McH. 363 (Md. 1770); Apthorp v.
Shepard, Quincy 298 (Mass. 1768); Act Relative to Juries and Verdicts, ch. 674 § 18
N.J. Laws 249, 253 (1797); Jackson v. Dunsbaugh, I Johns. Cas. 91 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1799); Sasser v. Blyth, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 209 (N.C. 1796); Price v. Watkins, 1 Dall. 8
(Pa. 1763); Dott v. Cunnmington, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 453 (S.C. 1795); Henderson v. Aliens,
11 Va. (I Hen. & M.) 113 (Va. 1807). Insufficient evidence exists that the device was
used in New Hampshire and Rhode Island.
104 GA. CoNsT. art. XLI (1777), reprinted in 2 SouRcEs AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED
STATES CONSTITUIONS 448 (F Swindler ed. 1973).
,0M Henderson, supra note 1, at 310.
,o6 See, e.g., Brent's Lessee v. Tasker, I H. & McH. 89 (Md. 1737).
,0M See Wright's Lessee, I Del. Cas. at 42.
,06 See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
309 Henderson, supra note 1, at 290.
11 Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, Ch. 20, 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (amended 1948).
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of the general verdict was called into question."' This question-
ing continued into the twentieth century when much support
coalesced for broader use of the special verdict to control the
jury 112 Jury control devices came into more widespread use
toward the end of the nineteenth century "3 Eastern states adopted
procedures more quickly, "but by 1925 a majority of the states
had authorized use of the special verdict and the general verdict
with interrogatories. ""14 Although federal courts were not bound
by state practice, many federal courts used these devices."
5
Nevertheless, authority to use jury control devices did not mean
that courts frequently resorted to them;" 6 to the contrary, courts
used such devices very infrequently due, some writers suggest,
to the pitfalls of technical requirements of the device."
7
Advocates of the special verdict sought to distinguish the
civil jury from the criminal jury;" 8 they argued that the power
of a criminal jury to decide the law as well as the facts made
sense." 9 No similar justification exists in civil cases which are
private disputes between parties, usually concerning money and
not evoking the threat of a repressive government's abuse of
power.12°
Professor Sunderland set out the anti-general verdict posi-
tion:
[T]he general verdict is not a necessary feature of litigation in
civil actions at law, it confers on the jury a vast power to
commit error and do mischief by loading it with technical
burdens far beyond its ability to perform, by confusing it in
aggregating instead of segregating the issues, and by shrouding
See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 3; Scott, supra note 3.
1 See, e.g., J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 141-43 (1950); Sunderland, supra note
56.
113 See James, supra note 78, at 218; Comment, supra note 32, at 173.
"' Note, supra note 78, at 487
115 Id.
"6 Id., see Green, A New Development in Jury Trial, 13 A.B.A. J. 715, 716-17
(Dec. 1927).
117 See, e.g., Green, supra note 116, at 716; Sunderland, supra note 56, at 261-62;
Note, supra note 78, at 487
"I See, e.g., Sunderland, supra note 56, at 260-61.
119 Id. at 260 n.15 (citing Justice Gray's lengthy dissent in Sparf & Hansen v.
United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1894)).
120 Id. at 260-61.
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in secrecy and mystery the actual results of its deliberations.
Every one of these defects is absent from the special verdict.
Why then should not the general verdict in civil cases be
abolished and the special verdict take its place?' 2'
Sunderland also indicated that the principal objections to the
special verdict were the risks that immaterial matters might be
presented to the jury; material matters might not be presented;
conclusions of law or evidentiary instead of ultimate facts might
be found; and, misleading or prejudicial questions might be put
to the jury 122 As Sunderland recognized, however, the practical
problems of framing special verdicts were not the real concern
of the device's detractors. Instead, their objections stemmed
from their acceptance of the jury's power and right to decide
the law "The real objection to the special verdict is that it is
an honest portrayal of the truth, and the truth is too awkward
a thing to fit the technical demands of the record." 2 Sunderland
further characterized the general verdict as "the great procedural
opiate," one "which draws the curtain upon human errors and
soothes us with the assurance that we have attained the unat-
tainable." 24
Judge Jerome Frank also took up the banner of the special
verdict. 25 He was the most vocal and insistent advocate for the
view that the general verdict invited the jury to misbehave by
taking the law into its own hands and allowed bias and prejudice
to form the basis of jury decision making. 2 6 In Skidmore v
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 27 Judge Frank wrote a scholarly
opinion extolling the evils of the general verdict and the virtues
of the special verdict. The former, he argued, grants the jury
"the power utterly to ignore what the judge instructs it concern-
ing the substantive legal rules, a power which, because generally
it cannot be controlled, is indistinguishable from a 'right.' "121
M Id. at 261.
1 Id.
In Id. at 262.
In Id.
"I J. FiRNK, supra, note 112, at 141-43.
12 Id.
1 167 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1948).
In Id. at 57-58.
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Moreover, he contended that the principal underlying premise
of the general verdict-'"the assumption that the jury fully com-
prehends the judge's instructions concerning the applicable sub-
stantive legal rules"--is a fiction. 129
The special verdict, Frank argued in Skidmore, avoids those
problems of the general verdict, reducing, although not elimi-
nating, the likelihood that jurors' prejudice or sympathy affect
their verdict. 30 In addition, the special verdict results in judicial
economy because appeals focus on more specific errors-for
example, in the phrasing of a question or the giving of an
instruction-that could be resolved by less drastic remedies than
granting a new trial on all issues.'"
This endorsement of the special verdict was not a unanimous
one among commentators.3 2 Another federal judge, Judge Er-
nest Guinn, disagreed with Judge Frank: "The jury, in the
privacy of its retirement, adjusts the general rule of law to the
justice of the particular case. Thus the odium of inflexible rules
of law is avoided, and popular satisfaction is preserved."'' 33
Judge Guinn argued that the jury reflects the morals and stand-
ards of the community- "Of necessity, its verdict reflects the
philosophy, the background, the training, the experience and the
morals of each juror ,,134
Judge Guinn was not alone in his position that the jury
should have the power to decide the law in a case.' 35 As noted
earlier, the Supreme Court briefly acknowledged such a right.
The view that the jury is a representative of the people that
takes the sharp edges off the law and does justice is a powerful
part of our legal history 136 Those who favor the jury's right to
129 Id. at 64.
13 Id. at 66.
" Id. at 65.
132 See generally Sunderland, supra note 56, at 261-67
,3 Guinn, The Jury System and Special Verdicts, 2-ST. MARY's L.J. 175, 177 (1970)
(quoting Wigmore, A Program for the Trial of Jury Trial, 12 AM. JuD. Soc. J. 166,
170 (1929)).
"I Id. at 181.
,31 See, e.g., Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REv 12 (1910);
Wigmore, supra note 133.
136 In Skidmore, Judge Frank acknowledged this view; however, he argued that the
jury is not the appropriate body by composition or disposition to nullify duly enacted
laws. See Skidmore, 167 F.2d at 58-60.
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decide the law leave unanswered the issue of whether the jury
should be advised of that right; many courts deem such an
instruction improper.
137
2. The Federal Rule
While the relative virtues of the special versus the general
verdict were being debated, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures
were enacted. 3 8 In Rule 49, the drafters took a middle ground,
authorizing, but not requiring, the use of special verdicts and
general verdicts with interrogatories. 139 The use and form of
these devices is left almost entirely to the discretion of district
court judges. Neither the Rule 49 devices nor the general verdict
is mandated in any particular kind of case. 14°
The drafters of the Federal Rules attempted to deal with
some of the practical concerns that arose with pre-rule use of
special verdicts. In practice, pre-rule criticism of the devices
focused on several problems: (1) exactly what facts the jury
should determine, that is, evidentiary or ultimate facts; 4i (2)
"7 But cf. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Judge
Bazelon takes the position that such an instruction is appropriate and not likely to lead
to jury nullification of the applicable law, since jurors would be influenced as much by
the need to see justice done as by their sympathy for a party.).
" FED. R. Civ P 49; see the extended discussion of the role commentators played
in the enactment of Rule 49 in Note, supra note 78, at 489-501.
,3 Rule 49(a) provides:
The court may require a jury to return only a special verdict in the
form of a special written finding upon each issue of fact. In that event the
court may submit to the jury written questions susceptible 'of categorical
or other brief answer or may submit written forms of the several special
findings which might properly be made under the pleadings and evidence;
or it may use such other method of submitting the issues and requiring the
written findings thereon as it deems most appropriate. The court shall give
to the jury such explanation and instruction concerning the matter thus
submitted as may be necessary to enable the jury to make its findings upon
each issue. If in so doing the court omits any issue of fact raised by the
pleadings or by the evidence, each party waives his nght to a trial by jury
of the issue so omitted unless before the jury retires he demands its
submission to the jury. As to an issue omitted without such demand the
court may make a finding; or, if it falls to do so, it shall be deemed to
have made a finding in accord with the judgment on the special verdict.
14 Rule 49(a) states: "The court may require " (emphasis added).
14, See Walker v. New Mexico & S. Pac. R.R., 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897) (jury trial
right only applies to fact issues); J. FRANK, supra note 15, at 142 n.14 (citing CLEMENT-
SON, SPEciAL VERDICTS (1905)); Wicker, Special Interrogatories to Juries in Civil Cases,
35 YALE L.J. 296 (1925).
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whether omnibus questions could be used; 142 (3) whether jury
unanimity should be essential;1 43 (4) what action to take if ma-
terial factual issues were not made the subject of a question to
the jury; 144 and (5) whether the jury should be advised of the
consequences of its answers. 45 Complete exploration of the spe-
cial verdict device requires further discussion of these problems.
a. Evidentiary Versus Ultimate Facts
The evidentiary/ultimate fact distinction exemplifies the legal
conundrum courts created in interpreting the code pleading
requirements. Courts were unable to develop any consistent def-
inition of evidentiary or ultimate facts. Consequently the terms,
while often used, were frequently of little help in predicting what
a court would do with a given set of facts. 46 With special
verdicts, the generally (but by no means umversally) accepted
view was that only ultimate facts should be the subject of special
jury questions. 147 Distinguishing ultimate facts from evidentiary
facts proved problematic. At the other extreme, as ultimate facts
approached conclusions of law, they were likely to be character-
ized as mixed questions of law and fact. 48 In the special verdict
situation, this characterization led inevitably to concerns over
instructing the jury on the law to apply to the facts. To the
extent that proponents of the special verdict foresaw the elimi-
nation or minimization of jury instructions complicated by legal
142 Note, supra note 78, at 499.
' See Driver, The Special Verdict-Theory and Practice, 26 WAsH. L. REv 21,
24 (1951); Ginsburg, Special Findings and Jury Unanimity in the Federal Courts, 65
CoLUM. L. REv 256 (1965); Trubitt, Patchwork Verdicts, Different-Jurors Verdicts, and
American Jury Theory: Whether Verdicts are Invalidated by Juror Disagreement on
Issues, 36 OKLA. L. Rav 473 (1983); Note, Smaller Juries and Non-Unanimity: Analysis
and Proposed Revision of the Ohio Jury System, 43 U. Cn'. L. Rav 583 (1974).
" See Green, supra note 116, at 715-16.
"I See, e.g., L'Urbaine v. Rodriguez, 268 F.2d 1, 5 (5th Cir. 1959); McCourtie v.
United States Steel Corp., 93 N.W.2d 552, 562-64 (Minn. 1958); Anderson v. Seelow,
271 N.W 844, 846 (Wis. 1937).
146 Sunderland, supra note 56, at 261-65.
141 See James, supra note 78, at 242 ("To support a judgment the verdict has to
include findings upon all the material facts in issue, and it must do so by stating without
ambiguity facts, not evidence or conclusions of law.").
" Id., see Sunderland, supra note 56, at 261 (The history of the use of special
verdicts is "a rocky road strewn with innumerable wrecks.").
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language and defimtions, the existence of mixed questions seemed
an impediment.
149
Rule 49 takes no position on the evidentiary/ultimate fact
distinction. The rule does require that the jury make a finding
upon "each issue of fact.' 150 This distinction, however, has been
raised in objections to the form of particular special verdicts
under the rule. 15' The rule specifies only "written questions
susceptible of categorical or other brief answer or written
forms of the several special findings which might properly be
made under the pleadings and evidence; or such other
method of submitting the issues and requiring the written find-
ings thereon as it deems most appropriate.' '152 Also, the rule
anticipates that juries will be required in some instances to apply
the law to the facts they have found: "The court shall give to
the jury such explanation and instruction concerning the matter
thus submitted as may be necessary to enable the jury to make
its findings upon each issue. ' '5 3 Generally, courts have taken
the position that only ultimate facts require questions to the
jury; 54 however, asking a question regarding an evidentiary fact
does not constitute reversible error ,1- Mixed questions of law
and fact continue to cause problems for the courts in interpreting
Rule 49(a). 15 6
b. The Omnibus Question
The omnibus question and evidentiary/ultimate fact issues
are related. The omnibus question concerns whether the judge,
1" See Note, supra note 78, at 493.
110 FED. R. Crv P 49(a).
"I See, e.g., Funds of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 545 F Supp. 1314,
1371 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
112 FED. R. Crv P 49(a).
1 Id.
"4 See, e.g., Erwin v. Keck, 351 F.2d 403, 406 (6th Cir. 1965); Maryland Casualty
Co. v. Broadway, 110 F.2d 357, 360 (5th Cir. 1940); Truitt v. Travelers Ins. Co., 175
F Supp. 67, 72 (S.D. Tex. 1959), aff'd, 280 F.2d 784, 789 (5th Cir. 1960).
"I See, e.g., Delpit v. Nocuba Shipping Co., 302 F.2d 835, 838 (5th: Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 915 (1962).
116 See, e.g., Tights, Inc. v. Acme-McCrary Corp., 541 F.2d 1047 (4th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976); W.R. Gnmshaw Co. v. Nevil C. Withrow Co., 248
F.2d 896 (8th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 912 (1957); Carpenter v. Baltimore and
O.R. Co. 109 F.2d 375 (6th Cir. 1940).
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in the interest of reducing the number of questions sent to the
jury, but still wishing to exercise a measure of control, may
simply ask: "Was the defendant negligent, was the plaintiff
negligent, and what damages if any are due?" The obvious
concern is whether the special verdict in this form retains any
benefits over the general verdict. 57 The possibility that sympathy
or other improper considerations will influence the jury's an-
swers increases as the consequences of the special verdict become
clearer to the jury Rule 49 does not discuss the omnibus ques-
tion, and courts have found the omnibus question to be within
the discretion of the district judge.'
5 8
c. Jury Unanimity
Defining jury unanimity is a problem in the special verdict
context,'5 9 particularly when different theories are advanced to
support a party's ultimate liability In a negligence suit, for
example, the plaintiff may advance several negligence theories
which might support a verdict in the plaintiff's favor. A question
exists whether jury unammity on at least one theory is necessary
or whether a unanimous finding of the defendant's negligence is
sufficient even though the jurors do not agree on any one
theory 160 In truth, this problem also occurs with general verdicts
which theoretically require jury unanimity on all issues; 61 how-
ever, the special verdict procedure highlights the unanimity prob-
lem. Commentators have grappled with this issue,162 courts have
not to any great extent, and Rule 49 does not address the issue.'
63
d. Material Issue Not Covered by Questions
Ensuring that all material issues went to the jury was a
problem in pre-rule use of the special verdict.'6 The only remedy
,17 Note, supra note 78, at 499-500.
'"' See, e.g., Erwin, 351 F.2d at 406. "Negligence being a relative term, the trial
judge was justified in submitting the questions of negligence to the jury. 'When the
trial court utilizes the device of a special verdict, [he/she] has wide discretion as to
the form and contents of the questions. " Id. (quoting Mickey v. Trenco Mfg.
Co., 226 F.2d 956, 957 (7th Cir. 1955)).
,59 See Ginsburg, supra note 143, at 258-63; Trubitt, supra note 143, at 474.
' Ginsburg, supra note 143, at 260; Trubitt, supra note 143, at 473-74.
"6 Trubitt, supra note 143, at 512.
62 In addition to the Trubitt and Ginsburg articles, see Driver, supra note 143.
"6 See supra note 139.
164 See supra notes 147-48.
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for omitting a question concerning a material issue appeared to
be a new trial, thus obviating the supposed benefits of the device.
Rule 49(a) tackles this issue head-on in two ways. First, the rule
requires that the jury return a "special written finding upon
each issue of fact. '1 65 Second, the rule contains a waiver pro-
vision; if the court "omits any issue of fact raised by the
pleadings or by the evidence, each party waives his right to a
trial by jury of the issue so omitted unless before the jury retires
he demands its submission to the jury 166 With an omitted issue,
Rule 49(a) allows the court to make a finding, "or if it fails to
do so, it shall be deemed to have made a finding in accord with
the judgment on the special verdict."1 67
e. Informing the Jury of the Consequences of Its Answers
To the extent that the special verdict device represents dis-
trust of the jury and its ability to make a rational decision
unswayed by passion or prejudice,' 6 requiring or even allowing
the jury to be advised of the result of its answers seems senseless.
Nevertheless, practices prior to Rule 49 varied from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction, with some courts taking a very firm stand in
favor of informing the jury of the consequences of its answers.'
69
Two factors mitigate the seeming irrationality of that stance.
First, eliminating all reference to the relationship of the evidence
to the ultimate result in the case is difficult; second, the jury's
inability to discern the result of its answer may be exaggerated.
Therefore, some people argue, the jury should know the true
216 FED. R. Civ P 49(a).
'66 Id.
167 Id.
I" Note, supra note 78, at 495 ("Underlying the commentators' case was a deep-
seated distrust of the jury. "); see also Skidmore, 167 F.2d at 66.
When using a special verdict, the judge need not-should not-give any
charge about the substantive legal rules beyond what is reasonably necessary
to enable the jury to answer intelligently the questions put to them. As,
accordingly, the jury is less able to know whether its findings will favor
one side or the other, the appeal to the jurors' cruder prejudices will
frequently be less effective.
Id., J. FRANK, supra note 112, at 108-25, 130, 138.
269 See Note, supra note 78, at 513-14 and cases cited therein. But cf. Note,




consequences rather than speculate.' 70 The rule does not address
this issue except to give the judge discretion to instruct on the
applicable law 171
Finally, Rule 49(a) allows the district court to "require a
jury to return only a special verdict. 11172 Thus, the rule goes
further than the common law in allowing the trial court to
compel such a verdict.' 73 The rule does not spell out the conse-
quence of a jury's refusal to comply and its insistence on re-
turning a general verdict; presumably, the court would order a
new trial.
3. Rule 49 in the Courts
The rule drafters gave district courts broad discretion to use
the special verdict. This discretion provides maximum flexibility
in use and form, which is consistent with the goal of the rules
to eradicate formalism and needless procedural rigidity 174 In
addition, district courts may develop guidelines governing the
use and form of special verdicts. This flexibility was necessitated
by the relative newness of the device and perhaps by the drafters'
reluctance to lock in any specific procedures before the federal
courts had a chance to work out the problems with the device.17 5
The rule's flexibility has not resulted in a body of law
supplying guidelines. Instead, district judges appear reluctant to
pioneer for the benefit of the federal court system; attorneys do
not advocate its use, and consequently the special verdict is not
a popular device.' 76
170 See, Note, supra note 169, at 826-27.
'17 FED. R. CIv P 49(a).
172 Id.
,,3 See supra notes 89-99 and accompanying text.
'7, See Clark, Fundamental Changes Effected by the New Federal Rules I, 15 TENN.
L. Ray 551 (1939) ("[Procedural rules are but means to an end, means to the
enforcement of substantive justice, and therefore there should be no finality in procedural
rules themselves except as they attain that objective.").
M" Note, supra note 78, at 506.
7I Id., see Brown, Federal Special Verdicts: The Doubt Eliminator 44 F.R.D. 338,
352 (1967); Driver, A Consideration of the More Extended Use of the Special Verdict,
25 WAsH. L. Rav. 43, 45 (1950); Guinn, supra note 133, at 178; Nordbye, Comments
on Selected Provisions of the New Minnesota Rules, 36 MINN. L. Ray 672, 685 (1952).
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Rule 49 case law is very sparse and generally not helpful. 77
District judges have used the device in a variety of cases 7  but
have declined to use it in others;179 they have asked evidentiary
and ultimate questions,180 have asked omnibus questions, 8' have
taken back questions asked,1 2 and have failed to advise attorneys
of their intention to use the special verdict form.' 83 In almost all
instances, the appellate court approved the district judge's ac-
tions due to the broad grant of discretion under Rule 49 Lately,
the appellate courts have suggested the best cases for a special
verdict 84 and bave pointed out that a judge might utilize single-
issue questions better in the future. 85 Nevertheless, courts con-
tinue to affirm district court action.
86
4. Constitutionality of Special Verdicts
Unlike other jury control devices, most notably the directed
verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, special ver-
dicts were an established procedure at common law 187 Therefore,
'1 For an excellent review of the case law up to 1965, see Note, supra note 78.
Cases have followed the same pattern: very limited appellate review with broad discretion
vested in the district judge.
,71 See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980); Skidmore, 167 F.2d at 54; Flusk v. Erie R.R. Co.,
110 F Supp. 118 (D.N.J. 1953).
'' See Garwood v. International Paper Co., 666 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1982); Sadowski
v. Bombardier Ltd., 539 F.2d 615 (7th Cir. 1976).
,s See supra notes 154-55.
' See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., Diniero v. United States Lines Co., 288 F.2d 595, 599-600 (2d Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 831 (1961) (trial judge had discretion to withdraw ambiguous
questions even after jury had deliberated on them); see also Recent Developments,
Discretion of a Federal Trial Judge to Withdraw Special Interrogatories, 14 STAN. L.
REv 395 (1962) (discusses Diniero).
"I See, e.g., Cate v. Good Bros., Inc., 181 F.2d 146, 148 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 826 (1950) (overruled defendant's objection to a court's mid-trial announcement
of its intention to submit special interrogatories).
I" See, e.g., Baumstimler v. Rankin, 677 F.2d 1061, 1071 (5th Cir. 1982) (multiparty
patent case is appropriate for special verdict).
"I See, e.g., Cunningham v. M-G Transp. Serv., Inc., 527 F.2d 760, 762 (4th Cir.
1975) ("We strongly recommend that when special interrogatories are utilized they
be put in the form of questions, and that always the questions of damages be separated
from the questions of liability.").
"I See, e.g., Baumstimler 677 F.2d at 1061; Cunningham, 527 F.2d at 760.
'7 See supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
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few constitutional questions ,have arisen concerning the device.
A most notable exception is the statement of Justices Black and
Douglas in opposition to the adoption of certain 1963 amend-
ments to the federal rules. 18 8 The justices argued that "Rule 49
should be repealed [because] [s]uch devices are used to impair
or wholly take away the power of a jury to render a general
verdict."'8 9 General verdicts, they urged, are "an indispensable
part of a free government." 90 "Rule 49 is but another means
utilized by courts to weaken the constitutional power of juries
and to vest judges with more power to decide cases according
to their own judgments."' 91 The two justices also attacked the
special verdict device on a non-constitutional ground arguing
that its use results in confusion.
92
While the use of the special verdict at common law seems to
preclude a seventh amendment attack, a constitutional argument
exists that Justices Black and Douglas did not make. If one
accepts the historical evidence suggesting that the court could
not compel the jury to render a special verdict, 93 then the
compulsory nature of Rule 49 limits the jury-trial right as it
existed at common law 194 Because the device concerns the jury
decision making process, compelling the jury to use the special
verdict is not merely a refinement or modification of the pro-
cedural device. Therefore, the limitation on the common law
right to jury trial violates the seventh amendment.
95
Unlike the special verdict device which intrudes upon the
jury's decision making function by structuring its deliberative
process, the jury control devices that follow take the decision
away from the jury completely Each of these devices turns to
"I See Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 374 U.S. 865 (1963)
(statement by Justices Black and Douglas).
19 ld. at 867
,91 Id. at 868.
191 Id.
192 Id.
"' See supra notes 89-99 and accompanying text.
' Rule 49(a) states that "[tihe court may require the jury to return only a special
verdict" (emphasis added).
"I John Adams acknowledged that judges determine the law and juries only the
facts, "[b]ut it will by no means follow from thence, that they are under any legal, or
moral, or divine obligation, to find a special verdict, when they themselves are in no
doubt of the law." 2 THE WoRKs oF JoHN ADAms, supra note 42, at 254.
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a greater or lesser extent on the notion of "sufficiency of the
evidence." That notion, as Professor James points out, "is




Early use of the directed verdict was stymied by the accepted
rule that jurors were not bound to decide cases exclusively on
the basis of evidence presented in court, but rather "[t]hey may
have evidence from their own personal knowledge, by which
they may be assur'd, and sometimes are, that what is depos'd
in Court, is absolutely false. ",197 As the jury transformed
from a body of witnesses to judges of fact, and as the court
lost the ability to pumsh jurors by attainting them for "wrong"
verdicts, new means to ensure that juries decided cases on the
evidence presented became necessary 198 These new means were
the origin of the directed verdict device: 199 The comparative
lateness of their development explains the relatively unfinished
state of the directed verdict device in 1791 .20
a. Directed Verdict in Early Eighteenth-Century England
Existing evidence confirms that judges directed verdicts in
eighteenth-century English courts;201 however, courts gave two
types of "directions" instructions on the law and advice on the
facts.2 0 2 Unlike the modern practice in which the court takes the
case away from the jury because no question of fact exists, the
196 James, supra note 78, at 218.
97 Bushell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1012 (C.P 1670).
19 See generally Blume, Origin and Development of the Directed Verdict, 48 MICH.
L. REv 555 (1950).
I" Id. at 559.
"7 Id. at 559-61.
2' See, e.g., Girardy v. Richardson, 170 Eng. Rep. 265 (K.B. 1793); Shaw v.
Whiteman, 170 Eng. Rep. 72 (K.B. 1791); Court v. Martineau, 99 Eng. Rep. 591 (K.B.
1782). Blume suggests judges "directed verdicts" even earlier. See, e.g., Wilkinson v.
Kitchin, 91 Eng. Rep. 956 (K.B. 1696).
211 Blume, supra note 198, at 560.
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early use of directions lacked such force. 20 3 If the jury ignored





b. Demurrer to the Evidence
According to Thayer, the demurrer to the evidence came into
existence "when the general introduction of witnesses to the jury
and the requirement that evidence must be given to them publicly
in open court, had wrought the first revolution in this great
mode of trial.''205 The demurrer is a somewhat closer corollary
to the modern directed verdict device and was well established
in English practice prior to 1791 .2 6 The demurrer to the evi-
dence, like the demurrer to pleading, required the moving party
to admit all facts that his or her opponent's evidence proved or
tended to prove. 207 By demurring, the moving party agreed that
the jury would not hear the case.20 Furthermore, if the court
found for the party moved against on applying the law to the
facts admitted, the verdict was entered against the moving party 209
Early cases did not require making the admission of facts
favorable to the opposing party explicit. 210 The final development
and death knell for the demurrer was Gibson v Hunter,21' which
required that the demurrant admit in writing, on the record, all
the facts that the opponent's evidence proved and all reasonable
inferences. 2 2 After this 1793 case, the device fell into disuse.
Apparently, the Gibson requirement, not any determination that
- See, e.g., Sir Christopher Musgrave v. Nevmson, 92 Eng. Rep. 384 (C.P 1724)
(The evidence was "summed up to the jury by Lord Chief Justice Pratt, with great
stress laid on the evidence for the defendant. " However, the jury found for the
plaintiff.).
See, e.g., Smith ex dem. Dormer v. Parkhurst, 95 Eng. Rep. 414, 417 (K.B.
1738).
20 J. THAYER, supra note 7, at 237.
See id. at 122, 234; Blume, supra note 198, at 561-62.
2 Blume, supra note 198, at 561.
2W Id.
10 Id. at 562.
210 J. THAYER, supra note 7, at 235.
211 126 Eng. Rep. 499 (H.L. 1793).
22 Id. at 509.
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the procedure was an improper encroachment on the jury-trial
right, caused the demurrer's demise.
21 3
Although the demurrer to the evidence existed in the Amer-
ican colomes, it was not a long-lived or popular device.214 One
commentator in the mid-mneteenth century explained:
Where the evidence on the part of the plaintiff is all intro-
duced, if the defendant's counsel are of the opinion that, in
point of law, the plaintiff cannot recover, he may demur to
the evidence. But this course has now become nearly obsolete,
and can seldom be adopted with safety, since such a demurrer
admits not only all the facts directly stated in it, but also all
the facts which the evidence legally tends in any degree to
prove.2
15
c. Directed Verdict in American Courts
The modern form of the directed verdict device came into
widespread use in state courts during the nineteenth century216
when concern over unbridled jury decision making was strong.
By 1850, the Supreme Court had acknowledged the right of a
requesting party defendant to have an instruction "that, if the
evidence is believed by the jury to be true, the plaintiff is not
entitled to recover ",217 The Court noted that a jury had no right
to assume the truth of any material fact.
Hence the practice of granting an instruction like the pres-
ent, which makes it imperative upon the jury to find a verdict
for the defendant, and which has in many States superseded
that ancient practice of a demurrer to evidence. It answers the
same purpose, and should be tested by the same rules. 2 s
213 See J. THAYER, supra note 7, at 235-37. According to Thayer, Gibson "com-
pelled the demurring party to abandon wholly a notion, which seems to have existed in
the profession, that by this proceeding he was shifting to the court the duty of 'judging
the facts, and was thus avoiding the uncertainties of the jury." Id. at 235.
214 See Note, Has a Trial Judge of a United States Court the Right to Direct a
Verdict, 24 YALE L.J. 127 (1914).
2I Colby's (Massachusetts) Practice 242 (1848).
216 See generally Comment, supra note 32, at 173.




The Court did not spell out the consequences of the jury's failure
to comply with such an imperative instruction.
From subsequent Supreme Court cases, a standard for allow-
ing the direction of a verdict evolved. The earliest cases required
that "no evidence whatever" exists to prove the plaintiff's
claims. 219 By 1871, the Court had rejected its earlier view-
Formerly it was held that if there was what is called a scintilla
of evidence in support of a case the judge was bound to leave
it to the jury, but recent decisions of high authority have
established a more reasonable rule, that in every case, before
the evidence is left to the jury, there is a prelimnary question
for the judge, not whether there is literally no evidence, but
whether there is any upon which a jury can properly proceed
to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the
onus of proof is imposed.220
2. Developing a Federal Standard
Although the directed verdict gained early acceptance in
federal courts, establishing a clear standard for the device re-
mained. The Supreme Court rejected the "scintilla rule," the
standard that allowed the trial court to direct a verdict only
when no evidence supported the party moved against. In the
place of the scintilla rule, the Court adopted a general standard
for state and federal courts: Could a reasonable person find in
favor of the party moved against based on the presented evi-
dence? If yes, then sufficient evidence exists for jury consider-
ation. If no, then insufficient evidence exists as a matter of law;
therefore, no facts exist for jurors to determine. 221 After the
219 Id. at 654. See Richardson v. City of Boston, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 263, 268-69
(1856).
If there be "no evidence whatever," as in the case of Parks v. Ross
to prove the averments of the declaration, it is the duty of the court to
give such peremptory instruction. But if there be some evidence tending to
support the averment, its value must be submitted to the jury with proper
instructions from the court.
Id.
Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 442, 448 (1871).
221 Cf. Continental Ins. Co. of New York v. Sherman, 439 F.2d 1294, 1300 (5th
Cir. 1971); Simblest v. Maynard, 427 F.2d 1, 4 (2d Cir. 1970). But see Pennsylvania
,R.R. Co. v. Chamberlain, 288 U.S. 333, 343 (1933) (A directed verdict is appropriate
"if a verdict were rendered for one of the parties [and] the other would be entitled to
a new trial. ").
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Court established a standard and its corollary that evidence must
be considered in the light most favorable to the party moved
against tm-an echo of the demurrer to evidence-important
questions remained: First, what evidence must be considered
upon a directed verdict motion? Second, how are questions of
credibility handled? 23
a. Evidence to Be Considered
Three views exist under a directed verdict motion: the judge
may consider (1) all of the evidence, (2) only the evidence
favorable to the party moved against, or (3) all the evidence
favorable to the party moved against and any evidence favoring
the moving party that is uncontradicted and ummpeached." The
second view probably originated in the demurrer to evidence
which requires that the moving party admit the truth of the
opponent's evidence and forego presenting any evidence. In
Wilkerson v McCarthy,221 the Supreme Court stated that this
second view is the "established rule.' '226 The Court failed to cite
cases supporting its statement, and arguably the statement is
dictum.227 Nevertheless, courts frequently cite Wilkerson to sup-
port the rule that a federal court must consider only the evidence
that is favorable to the party moved against on a directed verdict
motion.m
The first view that the court should consider all the evidence
in a case has its supporters.22 9 Some believe that the court cannot
assess the reasonableness of the jury's belief in the plaintiff's
case without also examining the defendant's proof in opposi-
tion . 0 Professor Blume conceded that a directed verdict motion
2n Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 57 (1949).
22 Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not establish a directed
verdict standard. Therefore, federal courts must develop a standard.
21 See Simblest, 427 F.2d at 4-5; Curne, Thoughts on Directed Verdicts and
Summary Judgments, 45 U. Cm. L. REv 72, 72-76 (1979).
336 U.S. 53 (1949).
Id. at 57.
2" See Blume, supra note 198, at 580-81. (This "established rule" statement "must
be challenged as incorrect.").
2n See Cume, supra note 224, at 73; cf. Simblest, 427 F.2d at 4.
22 See, e.g., Blume, supra note 198, at 581.
m Curne, supra note 224; at 75-76.
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at the close of the plaintiff's case of necessity requires the court
to consider only the plaintiff's evidence.
But where the motion is made at the close of the whole case,
the court cannot, with any degree of realism, look only at part
of the evidence without considenng the whole. A layman would
think it strange to see a judge wearing blinders to keep himself
from seeing more than a part of the truth reflected by the
evidence in a case. One may wonder if it is possible for a mind
which has seen the whole truth to accurately shut out a part.231
In addition, Currie pointed out that "if we begin with the
premise that the directed verdict is a device to keep juries from
acting unreasonably, any limitations on what evidence the judge
may consider appear highly artificial.' '232
Most federal courts support the third view"233 a court should
consider all evidence favorable to the party moved against and
any unimpeached, uncontradicted evidence that favors the mov-
ing party 234 Courts consider the latter uncontradicted evidence
because the jury is not free to disbelieve such evidence. As usual,
stating the rule is easier than applying it. Uncontradicted evi-
dence issues arise infrequently with documentary evidence and
more often with testimonial evidence.235
b. Credibility Questions
Whether a seemingly disinterested witness whose testimony
is uncontradicted may be disbelieved poses a serious problem
for courts applying the directed verdict standardY 6 Courts should
not compel juries to credit such testimony, the argument goes,
231 Blume, supra note 198, at 581.
2 Currie, supra note 224, at 75.
23 See, e.g., Fontana Aviation, Inc. v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 432 F.2d 1080, 1084
(7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971); Business Dev. Corp. v. United States,
428 F.2d 451, 453 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970); Boeing Co. v.
Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374-75 (5th Cir. 1969); McClure v. Price, 300 F.2d 538, 543
(4th Cir. 1962).
2 See McClure, 300 F.2d at 543; see also Annotation, Credibility of Witness
Giving Uncontradicted Testimony as Matter for Court or Jury, 62 A.L.R.2d 1191, 1201
(1956).
"I See Cooper, Directions for Directed Verdicts: A Compass for Federal Courts,
55 MIN. L. Rv 903, 928-40 (1971).
236 Id.
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because witnesses are often wrong.23 7 Moreover, the determina-
tion of a witness's credibility is an inherently appropriate jury
function. 8 Jurors must bring their life experience and social
expectations to bear in evaluating the demeanor of the witness.
"[T]he candor and forthrightness of the witness, his hesitancy
or willingness to testify, his evasion or concealment, his poise
or frustration, and his emotional reaction to questions indicated
through his demeanor and conduct on the witness stand also aid
in determimng the credit to be given his testimony "239 The actual
ability of jurors (or lawyers or judges for that matter) to assess
the demeanor of a witness is not at all certamn. 24 Thus, while
some courts have followed the lead of the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals to permit the jury to reject all testimony, 241 however
disinterested, unimpeached, or uncontradicted it may be, the
majority rule requires jury acceptance of such testimony 242
3. Constitutionality of the Directed Verdict
No procedure comparable to the modern directed verdict
device existed at common law in 1791 .243 Its closest analogy, the
demurrer to the evidence, while in existence at that time, was
waning in use and by 1793 was effectively dead. 4 Thus, that
directed verdicts were challenged as an unconstitutional imposi-
tion on the jury-trial right as it existed at common law is not
surprising. What is surprising, however, is that the Supreme
Court did not address this issue until 1943 in Galloway v United
States.2 45 Although federal courts had utilized the directed verdict
23 Weinstein, Some Difficulties in Devising Rules for Determining Truth in Judicial
Trials, 66 COLTJM. L. REv 223, 231-39 (1966).
21' Ladd, Some Observations on Credibility: Impeachment of Witnesses, 52 COR-
NELL L.Q. 239-41 (1967).
2'3 Id. at 257.
10 See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE A mcaAN JuRY 169 (1966) ("There is today
almost no real knowledge about how credibility judgments are formed, and a moment's
introspection is sufficient to remind us how mysterious must be this process. ").
2,, See Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265, 269 (2d Cir. 1952).
241 See, e.g., Chicago, R.I. & P Ry. v. Howell, 401 F.2d 752, 754 (10th Cir. 1968)
(dictum); Chicago & N.W Ry. v. Strand, 300 F.2d 521, 524 (8th Cir. 1962); Walton v.
Owens, 244 F.2d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 1957).
24, See supra notes 197-215 and accompanying text.
214 See supra notes 205-15 and accompanying text.
- 319 U.S. 372 (1943).
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since the first half of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court
declined to resolve the constitutional issue on at least one earlier
occasion. 
4 6
In Galloway, the plaintiff sought to establish that he was
permanently and totally disabled by reason of insanity and had
been so disabled continuously since May 31, 1919, the day on
which his G.I. term insurance lapsed for nonpayment.2 47 The
plaintiff presented some evidence, principally witnesses who tes-
tified to his erratic behavior at various times. The most impor-
tant witness was a physician who examined the plaintiff just
prior to trial and testified, based on the examination and the
plaintiff's medical records, that the plaintiff was born with an
inherent mental instability, "began to go to pieces" in France
during World War I, and was insane at all times subsequent to
July 1918.24 Clearly such evidence would have been sufficient
to withstand a directed verdict under the scintilla test.
The district court granted the government's motion for a
directed verdict,249 and the court of appeals affirmed.2 10 Before
the Supreme Court, the plaintiff contended that the evidence
was sufficient to go to the jury and that the directed verdict
deprived him of a trial by jury contrary to the seventh amend-
ment.251 The Supreme Court, in agreeing with the lower courts
on the sufficiency of the evidence question,2 2 relied primarily
upon an eight-year gap in the evidence.Y3 This eight-year period
occurred in the midst of the plaintiff's alleged total insanity,
during the period of time when he was married, yet the plaintiff
failed to offer evidence establishing his whereabouts, activities,
or mental condition during that time.25 4 Since the plaintiff's wife
brought this action on his behalf as his guardian, the court
found that the lack of evidence was a fatal defect:
24 See Parks, 52 U.S. at 652.
141 Galloway, 319 U.S. at 375.
'4, Id. at 381.
24 Id. at 373.
110 Galloway v. United States, 130 F.2d 467, 471 (9th Cir. 1942), affd, 319 U.S.
372 (1943).
'4' Galloway, 319 U.S. at 373.
252 Id.
2'' Id. at 385.
"4 Id. at 385-86.
[VOL. 76
CONTROLLING THE CIVIL JURY
No favorable inference can be drawn from the omission. It
was not one of oversight or inability to secure proof. The
only reasonable conclusion is that petitioner, or those who
acted for him, deliberately chose, for reasons no doubt con-
sidered sufficient to present no evidence or perhaps to
withhold evidence readily available concermng this long inter-
val, and to trust to the gemus of expert medical inference and
judicial laxity to bridge this canyon.
25
"To allow this," the Court held, "would permit the substitution
of inference, tenuous at best, not merely for evidence absent
because impossible or difficult to secure, but for evidence dis-
closed to be available and not produced. 25 6
Addressing the constitutional issue, the Court concluded that
"the short answer is the contention has been foreclosed by
repeated decisions made here consistently for nearly a century
More recently the practice has been approved explicitly in the
promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' '257 This
latter point lacks force in light of the enabling act for the rules.
That statute states that "[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge
or modify any substantive right and shall preserve the right of
trial by jury as at common law and as declared by the Seventh
Amendment to the Constitution. ' 258 If the Court meant to sug-
gest that the rules precluded Galloway's constitutional challenge,
it was clearly in error.
The Court was no more receptive to the plaintiff's historical
argument, pointing out that trial courts in 1791 had the power
to withdraw cases from the jury "by at least two procedures,
the demurrer to evidence and the motion for a new trial.' '259
The plaintiff objected "that the directed verdict as now admin-
istered differs from both those procedures because, on the one
hand allegedly high standards of proof are required and, on the
other, different consequences follow as to further maintenance
of the litigation. '
2 60
"I Id. at 386-87.
26 Id. at 387.
" Id. at 389.
us 28 U.S.C. 2072 (1982).




In disposing of the plaintiff's argument, however, the Court
held that "[tihe amendment did not bind the federal courts to
the exact procedural incidents or details of jury trial according
to the common law in 1791, any more than it tied them to the
common-law system of pleading or the specific rules of evidence
then prevailing." ' 26' The common law rules for controlling the
jury's fact-finding role were "changing and developing during
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, "262 producing
in 1791 "widely divergent rules among the states, and
between them and England. ' 263 The Court rejected the argument
that the seventh amendment embodies the cumulative effect of
these 1791 procedures in favor of a historical view that finds
that "the Amendment was designed to preserve the basic insti-
tution of jury trial in only its most fundamental elements, not
the great mass of procedural forms and details, varying even
then so widely among common-law junsdictions."214
Justice Black's dissent in Galloway took a wholly different
view of the history of the seventh amendment and its conse-
quences for the modern directed verdict. He cited Alexander
Hamilton for the proposition that the basic judicial control of
the jury function is found in a court's power to order a new
trial.265 He also cited the Court's 1830 statement:
The only modes known to the common law to re-examine such
facts, are the granting of a new trial by -the court where the
issue was tried, or to which the record was properly returnable;
or the award of a venire facias de novo, by an appellate court,
for some error of law which intervened in the proceedings.
266
Justice Black argued that the Court's tacit 1850 acceptance of
the directed verdict in Parks v Ross was "a departure from the
traditional rule.' '267
The potential of the directed verdict for judicial control of
the jury-control that did not exist in 1791-is at the heart of
2' Id.
Id. at 391.
16, Id. at 392.
2" Id.
16 Id. at 400.
26 Id. (quoting Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 474, 480 (1830)).
26 Galloway, 319 U.S. at 402 (citing Parks, 52 U.S. at 362).
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Justice Black's objections. Coupled with the Court's adoption
of the substantial evidence rule and the possibility that a trial
judge may grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict, Black
saw a "transition from jury supremacy to jury subordination ' 26
in the federal courts from mid-nineteenth to mid-twentieth cen-
tury
The Galloway Court provided little in the way of policy-
based justification for its conclusion that the directed verdict
was constitutional. Instead, the Court relied on a view that the
seventh amendment embodies only the essence of the common-
law right to trial by jury, which included jury control devices.
C. Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
1 History
Judgment notwithstanding the verdict, like the directed ver-
dict, bears a superficial resemblance to the demurrer to the
evidence. Its principal distinction from the demurrer and the
directed verdict is, of course, its timing, which allows the judge
to second guess the jury Henderson traces the device to English
common law and to what she describes as the "rather obscure
motion in arrest of judgment. ' 269 The judgment non obstante
veredicto (JNOV) evolved from that motion around 1750;270
however, use of the JNOV was very limited. It was appropriate
only when the defense in a case "was deficient at law-so that
a demurrer would have been proper-but when the case had
nevertheless been allowed to go to the jury "271 The device came
into more popular use in England in the 1790's.272
Two of the original states, Delaware and New Jersey, pro-
hibited use of the JNOV 273 No real evidence of its early use in
"6 Id. at 404.
20 Henderson, supra note 1, at 316.
20 Id.
"I Id.
Id. at 316 n.123 (citing Selby v. Robinson, 100 Eng. Rep. 409 (K.B. 1788);
Taylor v. Whitehead, 99 Eng. Rep. 475 (K.B. 1781); Badkin v. Powell, 98 Eng. Rep.
1195 (K.B. 1776); Ross v. Johnson, 98 Eng. Rep. 483 (K.B. 1771)).
M7 Dehorty v. Jones, 2 Del. Cas. 445, 451 (1814); An Act for Regulating and
Shortening the Proceedings in the Courts of Law, ch. 32, 14 (1784) N.J. Acts 80 (cited
in Henderson, supra note 1, at 317 nn.125-26).
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the other states is recorded. 274 In 1828 the Supreme Court af-
firmed a JNOV without discussion of the device.275
2. Constitutionality of the JNOV
Once challenged, the Court did not give the JNOV the same
summary validation that the directed verdict received in Gallo-
way In fact, the Supreme Court initially rejected the JNOV in
the 1913 opinion of Slocum v New York Life Insurance Co. 276
Arguably, because the standard for the directed verdict and the
JNOV are the same, the degree of court control over the ury
fact-finding function is equal with both devices.277 Hence, vali-
dation of one, as within the ambit of common law rules con-
cerning jury control, suggests validation of the other In addition
to the absence of a comparable device at common law, however,
the Court was troubled with the JNOV's apparent conflict with
the seventh amendment: "no fact tried by a jury, shall be
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law ,,278 Two conflicts
with the common law were apparent. First, the appellate court
ordered the JNOV in Slocum; according to the common law, an
appellate court could set aside the verdict below for an error of
law (e.g., the district judge's failure to grant a directed verdict
motion), but could not determine the facts itself.279 Therefore,
when the court set aside the first verdict, the right to jury trial
arose anew, and the appellate court's only option was to grant a
new trial.21
0
Second, more damaging to the JNOV was the Court's ap-
parent conclusion that the jury-trial right includes the right to a
jury verdict.281 Therefore, even when the evidence is clearly
insufficient and warrants the trial court's granting of a directed
verdict motion, "the court cannot dispense with a verdict, or
27" Henderson, supra note 1, at 317.
2I Dox v. Postmaster-General, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 318 (1828).
-6 228 U.S. 364 (1913).
See Cooper, supra note 235, at 903 n.l.
2' U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
179 Slocum, 228 U.S. at 380.
nO Id.
"I Id. at 387-88.
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disregard one when given, and itself pass on the issues of fact.
In other words, the constitutional guaranty operates to require
that the issues be settled by the verdict of a jury, unless the
right thereto be waived. ' '282 The logical consequence of this latter
position is that the trial judge could not invoke the JNOV
constitutionally The obvious challenge to the court's position,
and one Justice Hughes raised in dissent, is that the Court's
own standard for a directed verdict requires that no factual
issues exist for jury resolution. 283 Whether any evidence exists
for jury consideration is a question of law, regardless of when
the court makes that determination.
284
In 1935, the Supreme Court addressed the JNOV question
again in Baltimore and Carolina Line, Inc. v Redman.2 85 In
Redman, the defendant moved for a directed verdict at the
conclusion of the presentation of all evidence. The trial court
reserved its decision on that motion and submitted the case to
the jury, which found for the plaintiff. At that point, the court
held the evidence sufficient to support the verdict and demed
the directed verdict motion. The court of appeals held that the
evidence was insufficient and ordered a new trial on the basis
that Slocum precluded any other course of action.
286
The Supreme Court found great solace in the trial judge's
action: "At common law there was a well established practice
of reserving questions of law arising during trials by jury and
of taking verdicts subject to the ultimate ruling on the questions
reserved. ,,27 The Court then cited the policies supporting
such a practice with approval and held:
Whatever may have been its origin or theoretical basis, it
undoubtedly was well established when the Seventh Amend-
ment was adopted, and therefore must be regarded as a part
of the common-law rules to which resort must be had in testing
and measuring the right of tnal by jury as preserved and




211 Id. at 401-02 (Hughes, J., dissenting).
'U Id.
-3 295 U.S. 654 (1935).





With that largely unsupported assessment of the history of re-
serving questions of law, the Court reinstated the JNOV in this
new limited form in the federal courts.28 9
The last vestiges of the Slocum case were eradicated in Neely
v Martin K. Eby Construction Co. 290 The trial court denied the
defendant's directed verdict motion. The jury found for the
plaintiff, and the court demed the defendant's subsequent mo-
tion for a JNOV 291 The court of appeals reversed and ordered
a dismissal.292 On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court rejected
"an ironclad rule that the court of appeals should never order
dismissal or judgment for defendant when the plaintiff's verdict
has been set aside on appeal. ' 293 Only Justice Black, in dissent,
raised the ghost of Slocum, contending that the appeals court
"is entirely powerless to order the trial court to dismiss the
case. "294
3. The Federal Rule
Rule 50(b), which provides for the JNOV, codifies the pur-
ported constitutionally mandated procedures of Redman;295 how-
ever, the rule has done away with an express requirement of a
reservation. Instead, "[w]henever a motion for a directed verdict
made at the close of all the evidence is demed or for any reason
is not granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the action
to the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions
raised by the motion. ' 29 6 In addition, the appellate court may
enter a JNOV if it concludes that the trial court erred in denying
it.2 97 Thus, the rule laid to rest the major constitutional barriers
to the JNOV outlined in Slocum.
The Rule 50 procedure not only encourages parties to join
new trial motions with their JNOV motions, thus providing the
289 Id. at 661.
- 386 U.S. 317 (1967).
"I Id. at 319.
"9 Id. at 319-20.
29 Id. at 326.
' Id. at 331 (Black, J., dissenting).
21 See supra notes 285-89 and accompanying text.
"6 FED. R. Civ P 50(b) (emphasis added).
2W Id.
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judge with two sufficiency of the evidence standards from which
to choose, but also requires the judge to rule conditionally on
the new trial motion if the JNOV is granted. 298 Therefore, in the
case in which the trial judge has granted the new trial condi-
tionally, the appellate court that disagrees with the JNOV ruling
may simply go along with the new tnal grant. In fact, the rule
requires that the "new trial shall proceed unless the appellate
court has otherwise ordered. ' 299 If the trial court conditionally
denied the new trial motion, a party may raise the denial as
error on appeal, and the appellate court may order a new trial. 3°°
The obvious advantage of Rule 50 procedures is that the new
trial will proceed in most cases, saving time and resources of
both courts.
D. New Trial Motions
1. History
a. English
Of all the jury control devices, the granting of new trials has
raised the least objections and has caused the fewest concerns.
The explanation is twofold: first, granting new trials was well
established at common law to correct errors or to remedy unjust
verdicts;30 1 second, this procedure does not take the decision
making in a case away from the jury, just away from a particular
jury One body of fact finders is substituted for another, but
the parties' right to a jury verdict is maintained. 302 This latter
point suggests that the impact on the seventh amendment is
lessened greatly when another jury rather than the judge decides
the facts and the sufficiency thereof.
The earliest uses of the new trial at common law involved
jury misconduct.3 03 In several instances, courts granted new trials
FED. R. CIv P 50(c).
2" Id.
3 Id.
" J. THAYER, supra note 7, at 169. But cf. Riddell, New Trial at Common Law,
26 YALE L.J. 49 (1916) (Canadian practice does not allow the trial judge to grant a new
trial).
. To a judicial system which used the attaint, the notion of a second jury
reconsidering the factual determinations of the first would not have seemed strange.
M" J. THAYER, supra note 7, at 169.
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when jurors had accepted food from a party while they were
out, or when the bailiff had permitted jurors to eat and to drink
during their deliberations. 3°4 Jurors' acceptance of papers deliv-
ered to them outside court by a party was also grounds for a
new trial. 3 °5
Practically speaking, the attaint became obsolete by the sev-
enteenth century (although not officially abolished until the nine-
teenth century),306 and the court in Bushell's Case3°7 held that
the jurors could not be fined or imprisoned for refusing to
convict William Penn and William Mead of taking part in an
unlawful assembly 308 Thus, common law courts faced the prob-
lem of how to control the jury One response of the English
courts involved using some form of the special verdict, but
Bushell's Case and subsequent law in England also affirmed the
jury's right to return a general verdict. 3 9 Moreover, the special
verdict device did not solve the problem of a jury that, in the
court's view, decided incorrectly
Extension of the court's power to grant a new trial was a
logical path. 310 Granting a new trial based upon jury misconduct
is not far from a new trial based upon the jurors acting contrary
to law or in an irrational manner 311 Thayer suggests that this
new power evolved slowly, however, because it involved the
courts "undertaking to revise the action of the jury in a region
belonging peculiarly to them, and was going beyond anything
that had formerly been done. ' 312 In addition, the argument in
Bushell's Case-that the judge could not know the basis for the
jury's decision because the jury was free to draw upon its own
knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the case-was
equally applicable to granting a new trial based on the judgment
that the jury's verdict was against the weight of the evidence. 313
1 Riddell, supra note 301, at 54-55 n.12.
305 Id.
306 J. THAYER, supra note 7, at 169.
Bushell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. at 1006.
3M8 Id.
109 Id., see supra notes 89-99 and accompanying text.
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"[H]ow should the court know the jury's verdict was against
evidence? And how should they know what the law was until
they knew what the facts were, since the law, as applicable to
the case, was inextricably bound up with some defimte suppo-
sition of fact?"
314
Nevertheless, courts used the new trial as early as the first
half of the seventeenth century315 under a procedure whereby
jurors revealed publicly their private knowledge about the case.
3 16
Thayer claims the jury's right to rely on its private knowledge
continued well into the eighteenth century 317 Also, he suggests
that increasing use of the new trial device helped transform the
jury system by constricting the instances in which the jury might
rely upon its private knowledge. 318 By 1816, the accepted maxim
was that the juror "should enter the box altogether uninformed
on the issue which he will have to decide", in fact, "a judge
who should tell jurors to consider as evidence their own ac-
quaintance with matters in dispute would misdirect them.
319
Thayer claimed that the earliest reported case of this "mod-
ern new trial" occurred in 1655 in the Upper Bench, when a
court set aside a jury award as excessive and granted a new
trial.320 In a 1757 case, however, Lord Mansfield suggested that
the practice may predate 1655, but the "old report books do
not give any accounts of determinations made by the court upon
motions. ' 321 He thereby rejected a case stating that no new trials
were granted after a trial at bar 322 Thayer's conclusion, after
examination of the range of opinion in the English case law of
the time, is that "in the early part of the seventeenth century
the practice of revising and setting aside the verdicts of juries,
31- Id.
-' Id., Riddell, supra note 301, at 55.
316 J. THAYER, supra note 7, at 170.
317 Id.
31 Id.
319 2 L. Pixa, HISTORY OF CRIME IN ENGLAND 368-69 (1876) (discussing The King
v. Sutton, 105 Eng. Rep. 931 (K.B. 1816)).
30 J. THAYER, supra note 7, at 170 (citing Wood v. Gunston, 82 Eng. Rep. 863,
864, 867 (K.B. 1655)).




as being contrary to the evidence, was first introduced, or, at
any rate, clearly recognized and established.
' 323
Sir William Holdsworth cited an additional reason for the
more expansive use of the new trial device in the common law
courts .324 In the sixteenth century the Star Chamber could punish
jurors for incorrect or false verdicts. 35 The ground for such
punishment was that the jury must have been corrupt to enter
such a verdict. 326 Holdsworth wrote that courts tended to use
this power by the end of the sixteenth century "only if the
verdict was so obviously foolish that corruption might be as-
sumed. ' 327 After the Restoration and following the abolition of
the Star Chamber in 1640, the onus was upon the common law
courts to devise a means of dealing with these false, corrupt, or
unjust verdicts. This may then have served as an additional
impetus for those courts to develop the new trial motion. 328
b. American
The attaint had a very short ineffective life in colomal Amer-
ica.329 The demurrer to the evidence, while used more frequently,
was rendered less effective by the requirement of a written
admission to the truth of the facts as shown by the moved-
against party's evidence. 330 New trial motions based on jury
verdicts contrary to the evidence were readily accepted in state
and federal courts.331 The standard that emerged was that of the
English common law-
[I]t is the duty of the trial judge to set aside a new trial, if he
is of the opinion that the verdict is against the clear weight of
the evidence, or is based upon evidence which is false, or will
12 J. THAYER, supra note 7, at 172.
:2 W HOLDSWORTH, supra note 7 at 343.
'" Id., see J. THAYER, supra note 7, at 172 n.4.
32 See W HoLDswoRTH, supra note 7, at 343.
3" Id. at 344.
32 Id. at 343-44.
32 See Henderson, supra note 1, at 307.
3" See Note, supra note 214, at 134-36 (citing Colby's (Massachusetts) Practice 242
(1848)).
33 See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Yeatts, 122 F.2d 350, 353 (4th Cir.
1941).
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result in a miscarriage of justice, even though there may be
substantial evidence which would prevent the direction of a
verdict. 33
2
In the federal courts, two issues arose regarding the granting
of motions for a new trial. The first concerned the power of an
appellate court to order a new trial based on the failure of the
evidence to support the jury's verdict. 333 The second issue per-
tained to a challenge that the jury's determination of the damage
amount was not supported by the evidence. 334
2. Appellate Court's Right to Grant a New Trial
The Judiciary Act of 1789 and the seventh amendment were
sources of objection to vesting the power to grant new trials in
the appellate courts. The Judiciary Act was adopted about twenty-
seven months before the seventh amendment took effect. 335 The
Act contained an express prohibition against appellate court
reversal based upon any error of fact336 that some said precluded
an appellate court from granting a new trial because the verdict
was contrary to the evidence.3 7 To do so, it was argued, would
reverse the court below on an error of fact. 338 As the notion
evolved that the granting of such a motion depended upon a
question of law, that is, upon the sufficiency of the evidence,
appellate courts entered new trial orders or, even on rare occa-
331 Id. at 352-53.
" See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 122 F.2d at 354-55.
"14 See, e.g., Sunray Oil Corp. v. Allbritton, 187 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 828 (1951).
31 For a detailed discussion of the congressional actions leading to the adoption of
the Judiciary Act of 1789, see Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary
Act of 1789, 37 HIARv L. REv 49 (1923). In Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, the Supreme
Court relied upon this article to explain in part the reversal of Swift v. Tyson. See Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72-73 (1938).
"4 Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 22, 1 Stat. 73, 85 (amended in 1948)
[hereinafter Judiciary Act].
157 See, e.g., United States v. Laub, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 1, 5 (1838); United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 248 (1940) ("Certainly, denial of a motion for
a new trial on the grounds that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence would
not be subject to review.").
"I The Act's limitation on federal appellate courts continued m effect until 1948
when the new Judiciary Act repealed section 22. See Sunray Oil Corp., 187 F.2d at 475
(historical discussion); Judiciary Act, ch. 20, 22, 1 Stat. 73.
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sions, reversed the trial court's grant of a new trial.339 Even in
those appellate courts that found no statutory bar to granting a
new trial motion, the statutory limitation manifested itself in the
standard of appellate review That standard found that the de-
termination of a new trial was within the purview of the district
court judge; therefore, the standard allowed for reversal only
when a clear abuse of discretion occurred at the trial level.34°
The seventh amendment, in contrast, prohibited the reex-
amination of any fact tried by a jury other "than according to
the rules of the common law "-41 Those rules recognized that
the court might grant a new trial if it believed the jury's verdict
was against the weight of the evidence; 342 however, at issue was
whether appellate courts had such power at common law 343
Blackstone's Commentaries, the most widely available general
statement of the common law at the time the seventh amendment
was ratified, 344 outlined an English judicial system in which the
Court of King's Bench had appellate jurisdiction over the Court
of Common Pleas and all other inferior courts of record. Black-
stone cites authority in support of the proposition that the King's
Bench had the jurisdiction to correct the errors in fact and in
law of all the courts of the land; in particular, the court could
31 See, e.g., Taylor v. Washington Terminal Co., 409 F.2d 145, 147 (D.C. Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 835 (1969); Community Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Parker
Square Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 406 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1969); Brown v. Burr-Brown Research
Corp., 378 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1967); Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wright, 312 F.2d
655 (8th Cir. 1963); Sloan v. Colebank, 304 F.2d 668 (4th Cir. 1962); Southern Ry. Co.
v. Miller, 285 F.2d 202 (6th Cir. 1960); Hardware Mut. Casualty Co. v. Chapman, 272
F.2d 614 (7th Cir. 1960); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States, 264 F.2d 161 (5th Cir.
1959); Eisenberg v. Smith, 263 F.2d 827 (3d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 918 (1959).
On the question of whether this evolution is desirable, compare Wright, The Doubtful
Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MiNe. L. REv 751 (1957) with Carrington, The
Power of District Judges and the Responsibility of Courts of Appeals, 3 GA. L. REv
507 (1969); Note, Appealability of Rulings on Motion for New Trial in Federal Courts,
98 U. PA. L. REv 575 (1950).
34 See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 122 F.2d at 350.
"'3 U.S. CONST. amend. VII; see Blume, Review of Facts in Jury Cases-The
Seventh Amendment, 20 J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc'" 130 (1936).
341 See J. THAYER, supra note 7, at 172.
'3 See Parsons, 28 U.S. at 433.
3, R. POUND, THE FORmATIVE ERA OF AmEmicAN LAW supra note 36, at 9 (Pound
lists books available for the country's founders in 1774 and concludes that "[flor
practical purposes Coke's Second Institute and Blackstone are the repositories of the
law.").
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resort to the opimon of a second jury when the first jury
returned an incorrect verdict.3 45 Failure to provide for correction
with a new jury, according to Blackstone, would tend to destroy
trial by jury 146
3. Remittur and Additur
The federal courts' power to change an excessive or inade-
quate jury verdict or to condition a new trial on the benefited
party's willingness to concede to a reduction or an addition
posed a special problem.3 47 The power to increase or to decrease
a jury verdict amount was never seriously urged by the courts.
However, federal courts would condition the denial of a new
trial upon the plaintiff's acceptance of a reduced amount (re-
mittitur), and the Supreme Court gave approval to remittitur in
Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v Herbert.348 The corresponding
practice of requiring a defendant to submit to an increase in the
verdict amount to avoid a new trial (additur) never gained wide
acceptance. 3
49
In 1935, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality
of additur in a diversity case involving an automobile accident
in Massachusetts.350 The plaintiff moved for a new trial on the
ground inter alia that the jury award of $500 was inadequate.
The trial court ordered a new trial on this ground unless the
defendant would consent to an increase of the damages to $1500.
The defendant consented, the plaintiff's consent was neither
sought nor given, and the court denied the new trial motion. 351
The court of appeals reversed, finding that the conditional order
violated the plaintiff's seventh amendment right to a jury tnal.3 52
The court of appeals acknowledged that federal courts allowed
14 3 W BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *388-90.
'1 Id., see FED. R. Crv. P 50(c)-(d) (trial court has the power to grant or to deny
motion for a new trial, and this decision is subject to -appellate review).
34 See, e.g., Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
-8 116 U.S. 642, 646-47 (1885).
1,, This was partially attributable to the fact that no English common law precedent
existed for additur as the term is used in the modern cases.
3" See Dimick, 293 U.S. at 474.
3" Id. at 476.
", See Schledt v. Dirmck, 70 F.2d 558 (lst Cir. 1934).
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remittitur but held that the trial court could not condition a new
trial upon the defendant's refusal to consent to an increase in
damages . 53
The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, citing
both the history of such devices and their differing impact on
the jury-trial right. 354 The Court considered the common law of
1791 and held that a "careful examination of the English reports
prior to that time fails to disclose any authoritative decision
sustaining the power of an English court to increase, either
absolutely or conditionally, the amount fixed by the verdict of
a jury in an action at law, with certain exceptions. ' 355 Those
exceptions included some very early cases recogmzing the court's
right to increase damages awarded the plaintiff, super visum
vulnens.356 The last reported case that acknowledged the right
was decided in 1742, and the last that affirmatively exercised the
right was decided in 1733. 357 Courts rarely invoked this power,
apparently confining its use to en banc proceedings.
In any event, the rule was obsolete in England at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution; and we are unable to find
that it ever was acted upon or accepted in the colonies, or by
any of the federal or state courts since the adoption of the
Constitution.358
A second exception was the English court's power to increase
or to diminish damages assessed upon a writ of inquiry on the
ground that the justices might have awarded damages without
the writ; therefore, the inquisition was conducted only for in-
formational purposes.3 59 The last exception cited by the Court
was a practice in "some of the old cases" holding that when
the plaintiff's damages were a sum certain, the court had the
authority to increase or abridge the verdict of the jury 360 In
1764, an English "court reviewed the subject and reached the
Id. at 560-61.
"4 Dimick, 293 U.S. at 488.
"I Id. at 477.
356 Id.
Id.
"' Id. at 477-78.
"9 Id. at 479.
160 Id. at 479.
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conclusion that the English courts were without power to either
increase or abridge damages in any action for a personal tort,
unless in the exceptional cases just noted.1 361 The Supreme Court
concluded that:
[W]hile there was some practice to the contrary in respect of
decreasing damages, the established practice and the rule of
the common law, as it existed in England at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution, forbade the court to increase the
amount of damages awarded by a jury in actions such as that
under consideration.
362
The petitioner urged the Court to consider extending the
constitutionally valid practice of remittitur to cover this analo-
gous practice of additur, even though the additur did not exist
in this precise form at common law in 1791. The Court declined
for two reasons. First, and somewhat surprisingly, the Court
challenged the view established in the federal courts by Justice
Story, writing as a circuit judge, that remittitur was an accepted
feature of the common law in 1791.363 In his opinion, Story cited
two English cases, antedating the Constitution, in which the
court granted new trials based upon excessive damages; he con-
cluded from these cases that conditioning such a trial on the
plaintiff's willingness to remit a portion of his damage award
was proper He cited no case to support that conclusion. 36 The
subsequent Supreme Court case upholding the practice of remit-
titur in federal court simply cited Justice Story's opinion and
two state cases. 365 The Court concluded, "[i]n the light reflected
by the foregoing review of the English decisions and commen-
tators, it, therefore, may be that if the question of remittitur
361 Id.
'2 Id. at 482.
'6' Id. at 483.
Since the decision of Mr. Justice Story [writing as a circuit judge in Blunt
v. Little, 3 F Cas. 760 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822)], this Court has never
expressed doubt in respect of the rule, and it has been uniformly applied
by the lower federal courts. It is, however, remarkable that in none of




ml Id. at 483-84.
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were now before us for the first time, it would be decided
otherwise. 3 66 However, because the practice had been the law
in the federal courts for more than a hundred years and because
it does find "some support in the practice of the English courts
prior to the adoption of the Constitution," the Court in Dimick
concluded that the practice should be upheld.3 67
Having found that even remittitur hangs upon a very fragile
common law thread, the Court was unwilling to extend it by
analogy to the additur practice. Although both additur and
remittitur appear to impact equally upon the jury's fact-finding
role, the Court found that remittitur simply excises a portion of
an amount found by the jury; with additur, increasing the dam-
age amount "is a bald addition of something which in no sense
can be said to be included in the verdict. ' 368 Such an assessment
by the trial court, with the consent of the defendant only, may
"bring the constitutional right of the plaintiff to a jury trial to
an end in respect of a matter of fact which no jury has ever
passed upon either explicitly or by implication.''369
III. JUSTIFICATION FOR JURY CONTROL
To this point this Article has been concerned with establish-
ing the dichotomy between what society says about the jury-trial
right and what society's actions in the form of procedural devices
designed to control that right tell us about the place of the civil
jury in modern law Procedural control devices exist and have
existed in some form since the beginnings of the jury 370 That
fact indicates the perceived need for limits on the jury's power;
however, the extent of that need is not clear. The remainder of
this Article sets out and critiques various theories that explain
or seek to justify control of the jury It suggests an analytical
framework for identifying those limits on the jury-trial right
which preserve its value to modern litigation. This Article offers
a less formal, more functional analysis to justify controlling the
constitutional right to trial by jury in a civil action.
36 Id. at 484.
367 Id. at 485.
361 Id. at 486.
319 Id. at 486-87.
370 See supra, notes 77-85 and accompanying text.
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A. Historical Model
The preservation language of the seventh amendment and
subsequent judicial interpretation of its language suggest a his-
torical model to describe the evolution of the civil jury's role.
Such a model defines the scope of civil jury-trial in two possible
ways. First, in a view long held by the federal courts, the scope
of the jury-trial right was defined by the division between law
and equity that existed in 1791. To the extent that the 1791 law
courts and a jury were available to address the issues raised in
the modern case, a right to jury trial was implicated.3 7' A second
way of defining the scope of the jury-trial right and the one that
the Supreme Court currently follows requires consideration not
only of the historical division between law and equity but also
of the underlying rationale for such a division. Thus, if modern
procedural devices provide "an adequate remedy at law," a jury
trial is appropriate even when it never existed at common law
in 1791.372
Within each of these definitions of the jury-trial right, jus-
tification for controlling the jury exists. In the traditional his-
torical context, a modern jury control device is justified if that
device or something very much like it existed. at common law in
1791.373 Such a determination might of course turn on which
common law is applicable. The Supreme Court has held that
English common law is the relevant law given the diffuse and
confused state of United States common law 374 On occasion,
however, the Court has resorted to the common law of the
colonies to support its view of the scope of the jury-trial right.
375
"I, See, e.g., Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935) ("In order to ascertain
the scope and meaning of the Seventh Amendment, resort must be had to the appropriate
rules of the common law established at the time of the adoption of that constitutional
provision in 1791.").
"I See, e.g., Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970); Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369
U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
"I See, e.g., Dimick, 293 U.S. at 474 (discussing historical basis for remittitur and
additur); Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364 (1913) (rejecting JNOV in
part on a historical analysis).
3,4 See Slocum, 228 U.S. at 377; Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 5-8
(1899).




The more modern view of the scope of the jury-trial right
also provides justification for control of the jury Since under
this modern view the Supreme Court only requires adherence to
the essentials of common law jury trial and not to particular
procedural details, 376 one may argue that inherent in the defini-
tion of the jury-trial right is the notion that such a jury would
be subject to controls. Even Blackstone, with his perception of
the jury as the "glory of the English law" and "the most
transcendent privilege which any subject can enjoy," found lim-
its on the jury's power essential to ensure its integrity 377 Clearly
controls existed at common law, and, therefore, controls limit
the jury-trial right.
Both types of historical arguments are unsatisfactory to jus-
tify the current treatment of the jury If, as the Supreme Court
has suggested, the seventh amendment preserves only the essence
of the common law jury trial, and if particular procedural as-
pects of the common law system are not followed in the face of
modern procedural reform merely because they existed in 1791,
then the argument resting upon the preexistence of particular
devices is not very persuasive. Yet, left with the essence of the
jury-trial right and a virtually free hand in connecting the dots,
how can a court pick and choose among the control devices? Is
the answer that any jury control device is presumptively consti-
tutional and hence within the discretion of the trial court? The
Supreme Court's treatment of additur would suggest not.378 To
what extent does the seventh amendment's express prohibition
against reexamination of any fact limit a court's hand in this
matter9 That some courts view the clause as a separate limitation
seems clear, and an argument exists that the restrictions implicit
in that phrase should prevent both trial court and appellate court
reversal of jury decisions.
If one accepts that only the essence of the jury trial must be
preserved and, therefore, that the question is not whether to
control the jury but instead how to control the jury, then some
other theory of justification, whether political, legal, or eco-
" See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 390 (1943).
37 3 W BLACKSTONE, supra note 345, at 379.
371 See supra notes 349-69 and accompanying text.
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nomic, must be factored in to account for the choices made. A
historical model framed in this way only poses the question and
does not afford the means for answering it. It is merely a starting
place in our analysis.
A more serious flaw lies in relying upon an assessment of
the essence of the jury-trial right and correspondingly appropri-
ate restrictions on that right. Reasonable minds can and do differ
on the essence of that common law right. For example, Justice
Black viewed the jury-trial right as a broad right in which many
particular procedural notions are essential.379 His essential jury-
trial right would very narrowly circumscribe the ability of judges
to control juries.3 0 For Black, the essence of the jury trial is a
dozen people, unencumbered by judge-made restrictions, render-
ing a decision upon the facts, which the judge may not recon-
sider. This fact-finding (and consequent law-applying) function
would be so sacrosanct that only when one could show that no
evidence whatsoever supported the party with the burden of
proof could the case be kept from the jury 381
Dismissing such a notion as unfounded is difficult in light
of the English common law origins of the jury and the corres-
ponding colonial acceptance of broad jury power to determine
facts and law in a case. Even Justice Black did not go so far,
however, as to suggest that no limits exist on the jury's right to
decide the facts. Apparently he would have limited such controls
to the new trial motion and the demurrer to the evidence, both
of which existed at common law 382 Moreover, he would have
accepted a new procedural device that embodied the essential
characteristics of the new trial or the demurrer to the evidence,
for example, that a second jury rather than the judge would
determine the facts or that the movant took the risk of judgment
upon him or herself in the event the judge denied the motion.3 3
Justice Black's acceptance of some control devices suggests
that his perspective was more than solely historical: he also was
"I See Green, Jury Trial and Mr. Justice Black, 65 YALE L.J. 482 (1956),
110 See, e.g., Galloway, 319 U.S. at 396 (Black, J., dissenting).
"I Id. at 407 ("I believe that a verdict should be directed, if at all, only when,
without weighing the credibility of the witnesses, there is in the evidence no room
whatever for honest difference of opimon over the factual issue in controversy.").




engaging in an analysis of the respective roles of judge and jury,
based on notions of how the adjudicatory process should work.
While an argument exists that the sources of his analysis are
historical, such analysis requires more than simply locking one-
self into a rigid law-equity allocation between the judge and
jury Instead, consideration of the best allocation of responsi-
bility, the extent of the power the jury should have, and the
level of intrusion on that power which society is willing to accept
as necessary or good must be sorted out on other than the
historical playing field. Historical models are not merely theo-
retically flawed. Rather, history simply provides no model for
evaluating jury control issues. It only describes how each control
device emerged in reaction to a specific perceived jury failing or
abuse of power. Unless one is committed to recreating the ju-
dicial cosmos of 1791-an uncertain if not impossible task-one
has no other clear directive on what control devices are appro-
priate. Barring such re-creation, the historical model leaves one
with only the broadest lessons of jury history- control is desirable
and institutional balance should be adapted to changing circum-
stances. The alternative models of jury control justification build
upon the historical model and, therefore, retain certain historical
aspects, although history is not their dominant feature.
B. Legal Model
The legal model of the civil jury rests upon the assumption
that an allocation of decision-making responsibilities can exist
between judge and jury, based principally upon the law-fact
dichotomy Thus, juries are to determine facts, judges are to
determine the law, and the jury-trial right extends only to ques-
tions of fact.38 4 In the context of this view of the jury's role in
a civil case, one may find the most fully developed of the
justifications for controlling the civil jury 385 To the extent that
jury control devices enhance the performance of the judge as
'" This dichotomy of course has historical origins. See, J. THAYER, supra note 7,
at 183. The best evidence that such a division is inherent in the jury-trial right, besides
the preservation language, is found in the seventh amendment prohibition against reex-
amining facts tried by juries.
"I See, e.g., Frank, supra note 112; Sunderland, supra note 56.
[VOL. 76
CONTROLLING TIE CIVIL JURY
law giver and the jury as fact finder, those devices are justified.
Correspondingly, to the extent that uncontrolled jury discretion
is inconsistent with the performance of those rules, it necessitates
control. This justification is also the one most often relied upon
by those who support control or even abolition of the civil jury
right. It is, in its most common incarnation, the most functional
of the existing theories justifying control and takes into consid-
eration the most advantageous allocation of responsibility be-
tween the judge and jury, based upon presumed goals of the
adjudicatory process-to render correct decisions in an efficient
manner 386 The justification-of-control argument further assumes
that the jury trial is a flawed procedure, whose "major defects
can be mitigated.
' '387
The legal justification for controlling the civil jury rests upon
several arguments. These arguments have arisen both in the
context of determinations of sufficiency of the evidence and
determinations regarding control over the jury's decision-making
process, that is, special verdicts and general verdicts with special
interrogatories. First, one may argue that the general jury verdict
by its nature grants the jury "the power utterly to ignore what
the judge instructs it concermng the substantive legal rules, a
power which is indistinguishable for all practical purposes
from a 'right' "1388 Therefore, "cases are often decided 'accord-
ing to what the jury suppose [sic] the law is or ought to be,' "
and in a jury trial the law becomes " 'as fluctuating and uncer-
tain as the diverse opinion of different juries in regard to it.' ",389
Thus, such juries are not only the judges of the law but also
assume a legislative role.319
The legislative role is the feature of the jury trial that its
advocates most wholeheartedly embrace. Wignore wrote:
Law and Justice are from time to time inevitably in con-
flict. That is because law is a general rule (even the stated
I" To the extent that such an analysis implies economic concerns, see infra notes
455-59 and accompanying text.
I Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 167 F.2d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 1948), cert.
denied, 335 U.S. 816 (1948).
10 Id. at 57-58.
MI Id. at 58 (quoting Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895)).
11 Id., see infra notes 430-43 and accompanying text for consideration of the
political implications of this legislative role.
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exceptions to the rules are general exceptions); while justice is
the fairness of this precise case under all its circumstances.
The jury, in the privacy of its retirement, adjusts the
general rule of law to the justice of the particular case. Thus
the odium of inflexible rules of law is avoided, and popular
satisfaction is preserved.
That is what jury trial does. It supplies that flexibility of
legal rules which is essential to justice and popular content-
ment.
And that flexibility could never be given by judge trial.
The judge must write out his opimon, declaring the law
and the findings of fact. He cannot in this public record deviate
one jot from those requirements. The jury, and the secrecy of
the jury room, are the indispensible elements in popular jus-
tice.3
91
Others find the jury's role in this regard to be advantageous
since the jury can do "justice" in a given case and yet its decision
has no lasting adverse impact on the law; that is, "hard cases
tried with a jury do not make bad law, for they make no law
at all, as far as the findings of the jury are concerned. ' 392 This
outcome is preferable, some argue, to having the judge distort
or qualify the law to reach a just decision, for the judge's
decision on the law has precedential value.
393
The proponents of jury control respond to this argument in
favor of jury nullification in several ways. First, they point out
that if juries were unavailable or unwilling to ignore the law,
judges might have abandoned antiquated rules earlier or modi-
fied the impact of legislative judgments upon certain classes of
litigants. 394 For example, Judge Frank suggests that the "fellow-
servant" rule, often cited in support of unbridled jury nullifi-
cation, might actually support the contrary view That is, if the
jury had been unable to ignore that harsh judge-made rule, the
courts might have abolished the rule sooner Because the courts
311 Wigmore, supra note 133, at 170.
192 Skidmore, 167 F.2d at 59 n.13 (quoting Judge Chalmers).
393 See J. FRANK, supra note 112, at 112-13; J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN
MIND 174 (1930); Pound, supra note 135, at 18-19.
314 See Skidmore, 167 F.2d at 59 n.14.
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did not abolish the rule quickly and because some juries presum-
ably applied the law as instructed, a lack of uniformity in the
decisions resulted. "Aside from its episodic and capricious char-
acter," Judge Frank argued, "[s]uch 'law making' by juries
seems an unnecessarily clumsy method of nullifying undesirable
precedents. ' ' ag5 In addition, in courts in which juries historically
do not sit, equity and admiralty courts, for example, "the judges
have been less reluctant to contrive flexible rules and to revise
undesirable precedents. ' 396
Lastly, some argue that assigning a legislative role to juries
or allowing nullification of duly enacted laws by a "series of
legislatures, each consisting of twelve men or women, casually
selected as jurors" makes little sense.3 97 Allowing a jury to assert
a legislative role is absurd in light of the suggestion that jurors
are often not consciously nullifying unjust laws but instead are
ignoring (or perhaps misunderstanding) the judge's instruction
and bringing in a verdict for the party they believe should win. 398
A more specific argument in favor of jury control by special
verdict arises in thus legal context. The general verdict device
merges the fact-finding and law-deciding functions into one in-
separable conclusion. Thus, the purported division of responsi-
bilities between the judge and the jury -never really existed because
the jury had the power to render a decision without regard to
the law that the judge explained. Sunderland described the con-
sequences of this merger:
It is a compound made by the jury which is incapable of being
broken up into its constituent parts. No judicial reagents exist
for either a qualitative or a quantitative analysis. The law
supplies the means for determimng neither what facts were
found, nor what pnciples of law were applied, nor how the




3" Some experimental research indicates that juries do not remember or do not
understand the judge's instruction of the law, or they choose to ignore the judge because
of factors the judge instructed them to disregard. See, e.g., R. HAsTm, S. PENROD &
N. PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JuRY 80 (1983); Erlanger, Jury Research in America, 4
LAW & Soc. REv 345, 348-51 (1970).
1987-881
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
ments which enter into the general verdict: (a) the facts; (b)
the law; (c) the application of the law to the facts. And it is
clear that the verdict is liable to three sources of error, corre-
sponding to these three elements. It is also clear that if error
does occur in any of these matters it cannot be discovered, for
the constituents of the compound cannot be ascertained.
The general verdict is as inscrutable and essentially mysterious
as the judgment which issued from the ancient oracle of Del-
phi. Both stand on the same foundation-a presumption of
wisdom. 3
99
According to Sunderland, the solution is to make the use of the
special verdict compulsory- the jury reveals precisely the facts it
finds and the judge, for the most part, applies the law to the
facts. Because the general verdict allows juries to disregard the
law not only when they feel it is unjust but also whenever they
are swayed by bias or prejudice to find for a particular party,
the measure of control provided by the special verdict is pref-
erable.
400
Another argument that supports the use of the special ver-
dict, but perhaps is more generally applicable to the question of
whether a broad jury-trial right should exist, is the contention
that because jury trials necessitate elaborate and often lengthy
instructions on the law, the potential for error is greatly en-
hanced. 40 1 Special verdicts mitigate this effect by reducing the
instructions that the judge gives. More broadly construed, by
limiting the availability of the jury trial or by expanding the
situations in which the court may take the case away from the
jury, jury instructions and their contribution to reversals would
decline substantially
Proponents of very liberal standards for taking cases away
from juries on the basis of insufficiency of the evidence have a
straightforward legal argument. If judges decide law and juries
find fact, then no jury function exists in cases in which no
"facts" are to be found. Therefore, using one of the jury control
devices that turns upon sufficiency of the evidence is consistent
9 Sunderland, supra note 56, at 258.
Id. at 258-59.
Note, supra note 78, at 490.
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with the accepted allocation of responsibility between judge and
jury 402
Several obvious problems exist with this argument. First, life
is seldom as simple as the argument suggests. The usual case in
which a sufficiency of the evidence question arises is not the
case in which the party with the burden of proof presents no
evidence. Rather, in the usual case, the party presents some
evidence and the question remains as to how much evidence is
sufficient to require jury consideration. 40 3 The proponents of the
sufficiency of the evidence devices maintain, and the courts
generally agree, that the sufficiency question is one of law that
the judge decides; 40 however, some believe that this question of
sufficiency is a jury function involving weighing the evidence.
405
In addition, the legal model leaves the question of which
procedural device is appropriate to the discretion of the court.
The accepted view is that upon deciding that the evidence is
insufficient as a matter of law, the court may enter a judgment
by directed verdict or JNOV;4 however, Justice Black suggested
that the appropriate remedy is a new trial so that the party has
a second chance to cure the insufficiencies of proof.407 Granting
a new trial lessens the impact on the jury-trial right and is
arguably less offensive to the seventh amendment. The new trial
motion itself is further justified in that the judge must have the
power to refuse to accept what is a patently incorrect verdict-
the determination having been made that the jury's verdict is
contrary to the evidence and that therefore the jury verdict must
rest upon an incorrect view of the law or bias or prejudice.
In summary, the legal justification for jury control presumes
a clear delineation between the roles of the judge as lawgiver
and the jury as fact finder This is, of course, its major flaw as
a working model. The line between law and fact is illusory 408
4n See Galloway, 319 U.S. at 372.
401 See, e.g., id.
401 See supra notes 221-23 and accompanying text.
401 See Galloway, 319 U.S. at 401-05 (Black, J., dissenting).
" See supra notes 245-68 and accompanying text.
4"° Galloway, 319 U.S. at 400-01.
40 See, e.g., L. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 270 (1930) ("No two terms of legal
science have rendered better service than 'law' and 'fact' They readily accommodate
themselves to any meaning we desire to give them. What judge has not found refuge
in them? The man who could succeed in defimng them would be a public enemy.").
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Moreover, judges make some factual decisions, and juries often
make legal determinations; Judge Frank and his followers do
not seem to argue for a sweeping revision of what constitutes
"judge questions" or "jury questions." Thus, a model that rests
on the law-fact dichotomy fails to explain adequately the allo-
cation of decision making between the judge and the jury As a
consequence, a kind of circular reasoning and apparent confu-
sion exists regarding the sufficiency of the evidence control
devices. For example, courts and commentators have agonized
over how to explain within the legal model that a judge's as-
sessment of a jury's verdict as against the weight of the evidence
differs from the jury's assessment of the evidence in the first
place. Both decisions clearly require evaluation of the evidence
and factual conclusions, yet the former is characterized as a
question of law for the judge, and the latter is a question of
fact for the jury Such characterizations do nothing to explain
why one decision is appropriately the judge's and the other
appropriately the jury's.
C. Political Model
This section explores three variations on the political model:
(1) the traditional democratic model, (2) the legislative model,
and (3) the political-economy model.409 Under the traditional
democratic model, the civil jury provides a check on tyranny-
the jury introduces a democratic aspect into the judiciary, a
nondemocratic institution. 410 The political rationale for the civil-
jury trial has roots in the English common law and the view
that the jury was a check on the Crown's oppressive application
of the law
The jury-trial right in civil and criminal cases was embodied
in the Magna Carta when the distinction between criminal and
civil law was not well developed. 4" However, this view of the
jury as the defender of civil liberties in the face of unjust law
4 This Article recognizes that the latter two models are really variations of the
first model and will be presented as such.
410 See J. ADAMs, supra note 42, at 253; W HOLDSWORTH, supra note 7, at 347-
50; Henderson, supra note 1, at 295-99; Jefferson, supra note 35, at 81.
4" See generally J. THAYER, supra note 7, at 61-74; Henderson, supra note 1, at
291.
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reached its high point on the criminal side. 412 In criminal cases,
refusals to convict defendants of capital offenses were common,
in part perhaps because of the proliferation of such capital
offenses. 413 As a group, however, the seventeenth century crim-
inal libel cases perhaps were known most widely by the colonial
supporters of a strong jury-trial right.
414
The most notorious example of a criminal jury resisting the
power of the Crown occurred during the trial of William Penn
and William Mead on a charge of taking part in an unlawful
assembly 415 The jurors at first attempted to bring in an ambig-
uous verdict, insufficient to convict the defendants. The court
held the jurors without food or drink until they brought in a
proper verdict. At that point, the jurors came back with a "not
guilty" verdict, and the court ordered the jury fined and im-
prisoned. The jury was discharged on a writ of habeas corpus,
and the right to return a verdict seemingly unsupported by fact
or law was affirmed:
A witness swears but to what he hath heard or seen, generally
or more largely, to what hath fallen under his senses. But a
jury-man swears to what he can inferr [sic] and conclude from
the testimony of such witnesses, by the act and force of his
understanding, to be the fact inquired after.416
The American colomsts took this jury-trial right seriously
John Adams, discussing the need for a broad jury-trial right in
1771, noted:
As the constitution requires that the popular branch of the
legislature should have an absolute check, so as to put a
peremptory negative upon every act of the government, it
requires that the common people, should have as complete a
control, as decisive a negative, in every judgment of a court
of judicature. 417
"' See J. THAYER, supra note 7, at 166-69 (discussing Bushell's Case and the jury's
right to decide law as well as fact).
,," See Henderson, supra note 1, at 328 (since truth was no defense and malice was
irrelevant, jurors who disagreed with the "archaic and unpopular substantive law of
libel" had little choice but to acquit defendants using a general verdict).
414 See, e.g., Bushell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P 1670).
I Id. at 1006.
4 Id. at 1009.
"" 2 THE WoRKs OF JoHN ADAms, supra note 42, at 253.
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This notion of the jury as a democratic part of the judiciary,
which was otherwise viewed as an antimajoritarian check on our
democracy, was critical to Adams, who maintained that the
notion was as crucial as popular elections to those who favored
popular participation in government. 418 Moreover, Adams viewed
the jury as having the power and the right to decide both the
law and the fact in a given case. A jury should not be compelled
to find a special verdict or to render a general verdict in accord-
ance with the judge's instruction if it is inconsistent with fun-
damental principles of "general rules of law and common
regulations of society ",419 The juror has the duty in such a case
"to find the verdict according to his own best understanding,
judgment, and conscience, though in direct opposition to the
direction of the court.' '420
Thomas Jefferson's view of the jury as a necessary element
of a participatory democracy is also recorded; 421 however, he
acknowledged that jurors should "determine all matters 'of fact,
leaving to the permanent judges, to decide the law resulting from
those facts. ' 422 Jefferson's favorable view of the jury rested in
part on his distrust of judges who "acquire an Esprit de corps;
that being known, they are liable to be tempted by bribery; that
they are misled by favor, by relationship, by a spirit of party,
by a devotion to the executive or legislative power. ),423 If
the jurors believe that the judge is under any bias or influence
regarding the case, they have the power, according to Jefferson,
"to take on themselves to judge the law as well as the fact.
They never exercise this power but when they suspect partiality
in the judges; and by the exercise of this power, they have been
the firmest bulwarks of English liberty ,,424
The colonists clearly embraced the English sentiments in
favor of jury trial, both civil and cnminal. The first Congress
remedied the lack of a constitutional guarantee for the civil-
419 Id.
419 Id. at 254.
410 Id. at 255.
41' 3 Tim WR Tncs OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 35, at 81.
In Id.
423 Id.
"A Id. at 82.
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jury-trial right by proposing the seventh amendment, duly rati-
fied in 1791. Although circumstances have changed greatly since
1791, political arguments in favor of the jury have not evolved
much. Arguably, juries protect against government oppression
by refusing to apply unjust laws. Participation by common
citizens in the adjudicatory process ensures that the process
reflects the sentiments and beliefs of society And lastly, jury
duty serves an educational function, which is an important fea-
ture of a participatory government. Jurors learn how the insti-
tutions of their government work and that education may serve
a validating function for the judicial system-ensuring the pop-
ulace that the courts dispense justice.
425
Some modern-day commentators have seized upon this last
factor and argued for a socio-political justification for the civil
jury 426 These commentators maintain that a process such as jury
trial is essential to the perception that the judicial system is
responsive to the common will thus enhancing the cohesive na-
ture of society Judge Higginbotham suggested that United States
courts have a greater need for a broad civil-jury-trial right than
English courts because, under our federal system of separation
of powers, "the power of judicial review is inextricably linked
with the concept of an independent judiciary and its attendant
risk of autocratic behavior "427 This results, he claims, in a
politically conscious judiciary and the "peculiar need for the
democratizing influence of the jury because the success of judi-
cial review ultimately depends upon the public's acceptance of
judicial decisions. ' 428 Consequently, "the power of the great
constitutional decisions rests upon the accuracy of the Court's
perception of this kind of common will and the Court's ability,
4I See, e.g., Hans, The Jury's Political Role: "To See With Their Own Eyes," 4
DEL. LAW., Fall 1985, at 20; Higginbotham, Continuing the Dialogue: Civil Juries and
Allocation of Judicial Power 56 TEx. L. REv. 47, 52, 58-59 (1977); Thomas, The
Common Law Jury: An Essential Component of Participatory Social Justice, 8 AtsA
FoRUM 177 (1984).
426 See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 425, at 192-94; Wolf, Trial by Jury: A Sociological
Analysis, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 820 (1966).
'" Higginbotham, supra note 425, at 52.
4n Id.
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by expressing its perception, ultimately to command a consen-
sus. "'
429
Political scientists suggest a variation on the traditional dem-
ocratic model by considering the jury as a legislature.430 Partic-
ularly in the criminal law context, they argue that jurors in the
adjudicatory process act as legislators because they assess the
soundness of the policies of the criminal law This argument
hypothesizes that jurors also reflect public opinion when making
such judgments; hence, they perform a legislative role.
431
Criticisms of the traditional democratic political model are
many and varied. 432 Commentators attack the notion that civil
juries protect society against government oppression on several
bases. They distinguish between civil and criminal juries: while
they would allow the criminal jury to ignore the law when the
government engages in oppressive behavior, this same concern
is not present in civil litigation between private parties. 433 Even
conceding that the potential for government abuse is present
equally in civil as in criminal cases, abuse is virtually nonexistent
in either, and certainly insufficient to support jury nullification
as a practice.4
34
Jury nullification also runs contrary to the rule of law If
the political system envisions the elimination of the arbitrary
application of laws, then that certainly mandates an adjudicatory
process which applies standards uniformly and dispassionately 41"
Judge Frank noted that "[in the courts, this conception is
embodied in the idea of 'equality before the law'-the similar
treatment, judicially, of substantially similar cases.' '436 Jury-made
419 Id. (quoting A. Cox, THE ROLE OF TBE SUPREME COURT IN AMmUcAN GovERu-
MENT 118 (1976)).
410 See, e.g., Levine, The Legislative Role of Juries, 1984 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
605 (1984).
4 See Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L. REv 168
(1972); Van Dyke, The Jury as a Political Institution, 16 CATH. LAW 224 (1970).
"I See, e.g., O'Connell, Jury Trial in Civil Cases, 58 ILL. B.J. 796 (1970); Peck,
Do Juries Delay Justice? 18 F.R.D. 455 (1956); Pound, supra note 135, at 12; Scott,
supra note 3.
4 See Scott, supra note 3, at 673; Sunderland, supra note 56, at 260-61.
" See J. FRANK, supra note 112, at 127-35.
4"1 Id. But see M. KADISH & S. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY 54-72 (1973)
(illustrates attempt to reconcile jury departure from instructions and rules of law with
the need to administer justice uniformly).
436 J. FRANK, supra note 112, at 131.
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law in which the jury chooses to ignore the judge's instructions
violates this concept. "For 'jury made law' is, par excellence,
capricious and arbitrary, yielding the maximum in the way of
lack of uniformity, of unknowability ",437 Some legal rules are
"excessively inflexible" and may result in injustice unless indi-
vidualized in a particular case.43 1 "But individualization should
be accomplished openly, not furtively by such a surreptitious
technique as 'jury lawlessness,' which, as portrayed by Pound
and others, smacks of something very close to hypocrisy and to
deception of the public." 439
Actually, little evidence exists to support the notion that
juries act as little legislatures, amending the law to conform to
public opinion. Few studies have determined how and why juries
decide as they do, and little solid data exists. 440 In the most
ambitious of the recent studies on this subject, James Levine
hypothesized that juries, in making their decisions, reflect pre-
vailing public opinion. 44 In support of this hypothesis, he ex-
amined jury trial decisions convicting or acquitting defendants
charged with violating selective service laws during the Korean
and the Vietnam wars. Levine correlated the conviction rate is
such cases with fluctuating public approval of United States
military efforts. 4 2 The results of Levine's study are far from
conclusive; they establish only a weak correlation between public
opinion and jury actions. 43
'" Id. at 132.
4" Id.
411 Id. at 134-35.
440 A few studies exist linking certain juror characteristics, e.g., race or gender, to
how the juror decides a case. The results of the studies are inconclusive. See, e.g., R.
HAsTiE, S. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, supra note 398, at 141-44; Adler, Socioeconomic
Factors Influencing Jury Verdicts, 1973 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1; Mills &
Bohannon, Juror and Characteristics: To What Extent Are They Related to Jury Ver-
dicts?, 64 Jun. 22 (1980); Strodtbeck & Mann, Sex Role Differentiation in Jury Delib-
erations; 19 SocromETRY 3, 3-4 (1956).
4'4 Levine, supra note 430.
4 Id. at 612-13. Levine relied upon Gallup Polls and National Surveys to gauge
public opinion. Two types of questions were used: first, "those asking respondents
whether they thought American entry into the Korean War or the Vietnam War was a
mistake, and [second,] those asking whether they favored escalatory or de-escalatory
military policies." Id, at 612-13.
"I Id. at 618. While Levine charted a parallel between public opinion trends and
verdict trends, even he acknowledges that "the correspondence is far from perfect
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Some have suggested that juries do not reject the law as
unfair, unjust, or oppressive; nor do they find contrary to the
judges' instructions because they believe the judge to be biased,
as Jefferson suggested. Rather, juries ignore the law because
they do not understand it or because they are swayed by bias or
by prejudice to find for one party, regardless of the law (what
Judge Frank calls the "realistic theory" of jury decision mak-
ing).444
As to the argument that jury service educates the citizenry
and reaffirms confidence in our system of justice, Judge Frank
noted that no proof exists for the latter and that, just as likely,
jury service makes jurors cymcal about the judiciary process. 445
Moreover, should private litigants assume the expense of edu-
cating the citizenry9 446
Some have questioned the jury as a representative body and
a democratic institution by examining jury composition. 447 Juries
tend not to mirror society at large. Members of lower socio-
economic groups are grossly underrepresented on jury panels, as
are women and blacks. 448 Those called for service are quickly
especially in the first few years of the Vietnam War; the correlation (r) between the two
measures is an unimpressive 1.1." Id.
4 J. FRANK, supra note 112, at 111; Holstein, Juror's Interpretations and Jury
Decisionmaking, 9 L. & HuM. BEHAv 83 (1985); Sunderland, supra note 56, at 258.
" J. FRANK, supra note 112, at 135.
,6 Id.
[T]he need for popular participation in the administration of justice is the
argument most frequently advanced in defense of the jury system. If we
take that argument seriously-as something more than a rationalization of
an irrational adherence to tradition-then we face a clash of social policies:
(1) the policy favoring such popular participation undermines (2) the policy
of obtaining that adequate fact-finding which is indispensable to the doing
of justice. Which policy should yield? Is it less important to do justice to
litigants than to have citizens serve on juries?
Id.
", See, e.g., M. SAKS & R. HAsna, SOCiAL PSYCHOLOGY IN COURT 51-55 (1978);
LaRue, A Jury of One's Peers, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 841 (1976); Mills, A Statistical
Study of Occupations of Jurors in a United States District Court, 22 MD. L. REv. 205
(1962); Vanderzell, The Jury as a Community Cross Section, 19 W POL. ScI. Q. 136
(1966).
" See Levine, supra note 430, at 631-33; cf. J. HOLBROOK, A SURVEY OF MEMO-
POLiTAN TRIAL CoURTs rN Los ANGELES (1956). See generally Kairys, Kadane, & Le-
chozhy, Jury Representativeness: A Mandate for Multiple Source Lists, 65 CAnLF. L.
Rav 776 (1977).
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culled of doctors, lawyers, and other professionals. Underrepre-
sentation of some sectors of our population and the consequent
overrepresentation of others seemingly impairs the jury's ability
to act as the conscience of the populace or the vindicator of the
popular will.449
Avid supporters of the jury trial characterize it as an essential
element of a democratic, free society They compare the jury-
trial right to the right to vote. Yet, ample evidence exists that
democracies get along quite well without the guarantee of a jury
in civil litigation. 40 England abandoned the civil jury during the
two world wars due to a shortage of "manpower" and never
returned to the jury system in any significant way Currently
England provides for juries as a right in only a few serious
criminal cases. 451 Because England's civil jury was not constitu-
tionally mandated, its abatement was undoubtedly easier; how-
ever, that alone does not explain the lack of popular demand
for its return after the Second World War.
452
Moreover, if juries serve such an important political role,
why was the jury-trial right not extended to traditional equity
cases? Surely issues regarding the potential oppressive nature of
government arise in the context of injunctive relief. Historical
circumstances may explain in part why the division between law
and equity has been maintained, even after the separate systems
were abolished. Nevertheless, nothing prevents Congress from
expanding the jury-trial right to these cases; that it has not done
so suggests that the political model does not explain fully the




The third variation on the political model contains a political
role for the jury and an economic analysis of the efficacy of
that role-a model that could be characterized as one of political
,' Levine suggested that jury composition may have skewed the results of his study.
Levine, supra note 430, at 632.
410 See Tullock, Why I Prefer Napoleon (unpublished draft 1985).
41, See the discussion of the English move away from jury trials in civil cases in
Higginbotham, supra note 425, at 50-53.
411 Id. at 50-51.
4' For example, consider the fact that the jury-trial right has never been extended
to criminal contempt cases.
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economy 454 The political justification of a broadly available
jury-trial right, resting upon the fear of tyranny and the jury's
role in the "checks and balances" of our political system, is
analyzed in economic terms.455 Various costs arise with the jury's
involvement in a case. Votr dire, jury instructions, opening and
closing statements,, and jury deliberation add time and expense
to the process. Other costs are less clear. For example, the jury's
presence necessitates adherence to the rules of evidence, causing
possible delays in the trial and exclusion of relevant information
due to policy decisions. Exclusion of evidence may render the
decision-making process less efficient because it may make the
decision more difficult and time consuming; also, it may make
the decision less likely to be correct.
The benefits of the jury trial are a direct consequence of the
inefficiency it introduces into the adjudicatory process. That is,
by slowing down the process, by making the exercise of govern-
ment power, in the form of judicial power less efficient, the
jury checks the oppressive use of such power The question then
is, given the "formidable array" of checks and balances that
the Constitution provides, what is "the marginal checking value
of the procedural inefficiencies of the jury trial?"' 45 6 Some have
suggested that an answer to this question requires both a nor-
mative conception of tyranny and a determination of the relative
importance of avoiding such tyranny, compared to the potential
costs involved. 4 7 Only then will society be in a position to
analyze "fu]nder what conditions does one or another institu-
tional arrangement check the effort of would-be tyrants of one
or another kind to dominate the government." 458 Such an anal-
ysis may vindicate the position that jury nullification of laws is
not the best way to deal with injustice. Compared to direct
checks on governmental power, jury actions seem a weak cor-
rective; jury actions may make the systematic implementation of
04 See generally the exchange between authors in Tullock, supra note 450, Posner,
Why I Prefer Wellington (unpublished draft 1985), and Ackerman, Waiting for Blucher,
(unpublished draft 1984).
415 Ackerman, supra note 454, at 5.
411 Id. at 6 ("More generally, what we require is a theory of optimal checks and
balances.").
411 Id. at 6-7
4S Id.
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legitimate laws more difficult and thereby add to the inefficien-
cies of the system.
459
IV PROPOSAL. THE FUNCTIONAL MODEL
None of the models presented offers a wholly satisfactory
justification for controlling the civil jury Each affords some
basis for rejecting the concept of a broad, freely available civil-
jury-trial right subject to few if any controls. What is lacking is
any principled way of distinguishing valid from invalid jury
control devices. Therefore, use of certain devices creates appar-
ent conflicts with the scope of the jury right. The model that
comes the closest to grappling with that problem is the legal
model. Its principle defect is its strong reliance upon the law-
fact dichotomy to distinguish between the functions of the judge
and the jury Recognizing that characterizing judges as lawgivers
and juries as fact finders is not particularly helpful in allocating
decision making between them is not an original idea. 460 Some
have suggested looking past the labels of "law" and "fact" to
determine more precisely the theoretical basis for assigning the
former to judges and the latter to juries. 461 One commentator
designated the distinction a tautology- "A question of law or a
question of fact is a mere synonym for a judge question or a
jury question. '
462
I suggest that one may look beyond the law-fact labels to
identify valued facets of judge and jury decision making. Then,
one may evaluate the current jury control devices in light of the
extent to which they encourage or discourage performance of
the valued functions. Adding my voice to other voices attempting
to define law and fact is not my intention. Rather, those labels
are merely symbolic of the underlying functions of decision
making allocated to the judge and the jury The remainder of
419 But cf. Higginbotham, supra note 425, at 55 ("The dollar cost of juries is
insufficient to support any argument for the elimination of jury trials.").
46 See, e.g., Scott, supra note 56; Traynor, Fact Skepticism and the Judicial
Process, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 635 (1958); Weiner, The Civil Jury Trial and the Law-Fact
Distinction, 54 CALiF. L. REv. 1867 (1966).
"4' To most commentators, however, this means refining the definitions of law and
fact. See, e.g., Weiner, supra note 460.
,a Id. at 1868.
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this section focuses upon those functions, identifies valued judge
and jury functions, and suggests possible ways to weigh the
functions in balancing the interests involved. Full exploration of
the weight to accord the functions belongs to later research.46
3
The following analysis proceeds upon two assumptions: first,
that the civil jury will continue to be a feature of the judicial
system, and second, that the jury serves some valid purpose in
that system.
46
A. Identifying Valued Jury Functions
Three categories of valued jury functions suggest themselves:
(1) special competency, (2) public acceptance, and (3) equity
functions. The first assumes that the jury is well suited for
certain tasks and, therefore, that it should be encouraged to
perform them. Within this category two subgroups exist: deter-
minations of factual issues and determinations of credibility 4.
The latter is often identified as a type of factual issue, but is
sufficiently different to require separate treatment.
Even at the time Coke set forth his maxim, juries did not
make all factual determinations. 466 Certain factual matters were
within juries' purview while others were not. One may argue
that jury factual determinations in early cases were by and large
determinations regarding circumstances with which jurors were
very familiar. Since early jurors were selected based upon their
familiarity with the facts surrounding the case, one may assume
that jurors made factual decisions at trial that were similar to
their day-to-day decisions. 46 7 Thus, the issues before the civil
jury were relatively simple.
468
,61 For example, are juries better at gauging witness credibility than judges? If so,
should the value of juries performing that function be accorded greater weight when
credibility issues are determinative?
"A Obviously, these assumptions are subject to attack on several levels. See, e.g.,
J. FRANK, supra note 112; Scott, supra note 3.
46 Although one may consider that credibility is a factual issue, it is sufficiently
different to require separate treatment.
" J. THAYER, supra note 7, at 185.
"I Id. at 184-85.
4' See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10; see also supra notes 69-74 and
accompanying text.
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It is reasonable, then, to posit as the first special competency
function of the jury its ability to render deterrmnations in the
context of everyday factual decisions jurors must make in their
own lives. Therefore, evaluations of the evidence in order to
reach determinations of how something happened-did the
defendant stop at the stop sign; was the plaintiff in the cross-
walk; did the defendant intend harm- to the plaintiff-are deter-
minations with which the jury is charged. The jury's competency
to decide factual issues within common experience has been
traditionally assumed to exceed that of the judge. 6 9
Jurors may bring to the credibility decision, as to other
factual decisions, a certain expertise gained through life experi-
ences which makes them good judges of a witness's reliability
and truthfulness. 470 However, no evidence, other than anecdotal,
suggests that jurors are any good at gauging credibility based
upon the outward appearances and manifestations of a witness
or are correct more often than a judge might be. 471 It has been
hypothesized several jury members collectively may determine
credibility better than a single judge.472 This argument, however,
may be inconsistent with the existing evidence on small-group
decision making in general and jury decision making in partic-
ular.473 Nonetheless, the prevailing view is that credibility deter-
minations belong to the special competency of the jury
' This assumption is not universally shared. See J. FRANK, supra note 112, at
126.
Would any sensible business organization reach a decision, as to the
competence and honesty of a prospective executive, by seeking, on that
question of fact, the judgment of twelve men or women gathered together
at random-and after first weeding out all those men or women who might
have any special qualifications for answenng the questions?
Id. Empirical data suggests, however, that twelve member juries as a group do better
with fact finding and with application of the law than individual members or than six
member juries. See, e.g., M. SAKs, SMALL-GROUP DEcIsION MAKING AND COMPLEX
INFORMATION TASKS 26-33 (1981); Sperlich, And Then There Were Six: The Decline
of the American Jury, 63 JUDicATURE 262 (1980).
4 See generally Cooper, supra note 235, at 928-47; Dow, Judicial Determination
of Credibility in Jury-Tried Actions, 38 NEB.'L. Rv 835 (1959).
"I See supra note 240.
4 But cf. Bevan, Albert, Laiseaux, Trayfield & Wright, Jury Behavior as a Func
lion of the Prestige of the Foreman and the Nature of His Leadership, 7 J. PUB. L.
419, 444 (1958).
4" See Cooper, supra note 235, at 934-38; Vinson, Psychological Anchors: Influ-
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The traditional assumptions regarding both commonplace
fact determinations and credibility determinations as within the
special competency function of the jury are subject to challenge
on more general grounds. No longer is a jury composed of
people who are familiar with local facts and circumstances, while
the judge travels the countryside. No longer are jurors asked to
apply their special familiarity with a particular case. Judges are
theoretically as capable as juries to make the everyday factual
determinations with which the modern case is concerned. In
addition, if special competency with factual determinations were
an important factor in the jury trial, one would expect to see
greater use of "blue ribbon" juries and other panels comprised
of experts. This does not suggest that special competency is not
a valued function in our adjudicatory process. Various trends in
decision making-for example, increased use of arbitration, use
of special masters in complex cases, and growth of administrative
agency fact finding-illustrate the value that the judicial system
and society place on special competency The point is, however,
civil juries do not bring such special competency to their fact
finding task.
Submission of common-experience factual determinations to
jurors suggests an alternative function is being served. I would
characterize that function as one of "public acceptance. ' 474 By
virtue of public acceptance of verdicts, the behavioral norms
embodied in substantive law are transmitted to and acquiesced
in by society 47s The public accepts the verdict as valid only to
the extent that it perceives jury verdicts as representing deter-
minations of what actually happened, rather than as a conse-
quence of procedural rules. 476
encing the Jury, 8 LITGATION 20 (1982) (jurors' credibility determinations may be
influenced if press attends testimony or number of people in courtroom increases).
414 Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of
Verdicts, 98 HARv L. REv 1357 (1985).
47 Id.
476 Id.
The Verdict can articulate a legal rule: "You did the thing enjoined by the
law; therefore, you will pay the penalty." This message encourages each
of us to conform our conduct to the behavioral norms embodied in the
substantive law. Alternatively the verdict can emphasize a proof rule: "We
will convict and pumsh you only if your violation is proved by due process
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Juries serve a particular function in gaining such acceptance.
When neither the judge nor the jury has special competency,
when no indication exists that a given result has social value,
and when the need or desire for a lasting precedent is not
present, the judge should allocate decision-making responsibility
to the jury Nesson suggests that the nature of the jury decision-
making process is sufficiently obscure so as to "cloud the nature
of jury verdicts. 4 77 That obscurity allows the judge to "project
the verdict as a statement about what happened. This insti-
tutional acceptance of the verdict justifies the imposition of a
sanction on the defendant and furthers the inculcation of the
applicable legal rule.' '478 Dispersion of the decision-making proc-
ess over twelve persons rather than one decision maker may
reinforce a view of the verdict as valid and therefore acceptable
to the public as a judgment regarding what actually happened
and as a basis for imposing a remedy upon the defendant. This
function serves also to preserve the integrity of the judicial
system.
The last major category of valued jury functions is the equity
function. This category also is subject to division into two sub-
categories: decision making regarding so-called black box
decisions479 and equity by jury nullification. Black box decisions
are the difficult decisions that appear to compel arbitrary results
"in the sense that they can only be based on the specific equities
of each individual case and cannot convincingly be explained on
wholly logical or rational grounds." 4 0 The consequent jury in-
dividualization of the law is a concept embedded in our notion
of what the jury does. Examples of such jury individualization
include close cases concermng "no criteria other than pure in-
tuition.''481 Mr Justice Holmes described these cases as resulting
from the law's necessity to engage in line drawing; the apparent
of law." This message invites people to act not according to what they
know is lawful, but according to what they think can be proved against
them.
Id.
d n Id. at 1365.
478 Id. at 1366.
47, See Higginbotham, supra note 425, at 56.
" Id.
482 Id. at 57.
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arbitrariness of that line can be demonstrated by those cases
that come very near to the line on either side.
But the theory of the law is that such lines exist. As that
difference has no gradation about it, when applied to shades
of conduct that are very near each other it has an arbitrary
look. We like to disguise the arbitrariness, we like to save
ourselves the trouble of nice and doubtful discriminations.
[A]nd so, as we get near the dividing point, we call in the
jury 482
The equity function does more than simply let the court off the
hook as Holmes suggests. In addition, these jury decisions pro-
vide for individualized determinations that do not constitute
precedents and hence do not lock the adjudicatory process into
an identical result in a later case. This aspect of the equity
function is also of value to the judicial system.
The second subcategory of jury equity function is more
problematic. This function arises in those cases in which the
jury, for reasons of its own, chooses to ignore or to distort the
legal rule in order to reach a result contrary to that suggested
by the rule.483 Whether the jury's nullification of the law is a
valued function may be a consequence of two factors: the rea-
sons for ignoring the law and the type of case. As to the first
factor, supporters of the jury's right to ignore the law generally
argue that such a right is necessary to correct unjust laws or to
prevent enforcement of oppressive laws. 48 4 As suggested earlier,
however, much of the jury nullification that occurs may result
from the jury's misunderstanding of the instruction or its deci-
sion to find for one party because of some improper motive
such as sympathy, bias, or prejudice. In cases of misunderstand-
ing or improper motivation, broad jury powers to nullify make
little sense. That such reasons for nullifying exist suggests that
this equity function might be viewed skeptically
The type of case may influence the weight accorded this
subcategory of equity function. For example, the rationale that
supports jury nullification may make sense in a criminal case,
4S2 Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARv L. REv 443, 457 (1899).
"I See supra notes 391-98 and accompanying text.
44 See, e.g., Wigmore, supra note 133, at 170.
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especially a criminal case with political overtones which may
raise the concerns of oppressive government. 485  On the other
hand, in a commercial law civil suit, the arguments for the jury's
right to ignore the law become less compelling, particularly in
view of the commercial law's interest in uniformity and predict-
ability
B. Identifying Valued Judge Functions
Valued judge functions fall into two broad categories: (1)
those involving the special competency of judges and (2) those
involving the supervisory functions of judges. Within the special
competency of judges are not only decisions on those issues
pertaining to the law; judges in the common law system always
have decided some issues that could be characterized as fac-
tual. 46 Therefore, isolating the special competency function of
the judge is necessary-what makes it appropriate for him or
her-to decide those issues, whether labeled fact, law, or mixed
questions of fact and law
Judges presumably bring to the adjudicatory process exper-
tise based upon their formal education and their courtroom
education. This expertise gives them an advantage in resolving
issues that require such expertise, such as the construction and
interpretation of statutes. In addition, issues may arise in the
context of litigation, the resolution of which is intended or
desired to have a long-term impact. To the extent that the judge
renders a long-term impact decision, the social value of that
decision is an issue. For example, in certain areas of the law,
," See M. KADISH AND S. KADisH, supra note 435; Simon, The American Jury:
Instrument of Justice or of Prejudice and Conformity? 47 Soc. INQUIRY 254 (1977).
4" J. THAYER, supra note 7, at 185.
Courts pass upon a vast number of questions of fact that do not get on
the record, or form any part of the issue. Courts existed before junes;
juries came in to perform only their own special office; and the courts
have always continued to retain a multitude of functions which they
exercised before ever junes were heard of, in ascertaimng whether disputed
things be true. In other words, there is not, and never was, any such thing
in jury trials as an allotting of all questions of fact to the jury. The jury




consistency and predictability have a substantial impact on the
primary conduct of the parties involved. 487 The judge rather than
the jury has traditionally been assigned the function of deter-
mining such issues, and the traditional rationale for doing so
appears to have continued validity
The second of the valued judge function categories is com-
prised of the supervisory functions. This category encompasses
a range of functions pertaining to both the rules of the litigation
game and the promotion of rational decision making. Some
functions overlap and some functions fall into both subcatego-
ries. The judge's function as keeper of the rules of the game
manifests itself in several ways. The judge acts as a case man-
ager, a role that takes on added significance as the complexity
of the case increases. 4 8 As case manager, the judge structures
the case even before the trial begins. During the trial, the judge
may take an active role in managing the case, depending upon
his or her perception of the need for such judicial activism. In
addition, during the trial, the judge applies the rules of evidence
and, therefore, controls the flow of information to the jury
Supervisory functions of the court that ensure a rational
decision making process may also be implicated by evidentlary
decisions, for example, excluding certain evidence from the ju-
ry's consideration because it is inflammatory or otherwise prej-
udicial. The trial judge also ensures that the rule of law prevails
and that the jury's decision does not rest upon bias, prejudice,
or other improper motives. Such a valued judge function ex-
plains, in part, the judge's ability to override the jury's deter-
mination on issues such as credibility
One issue that should be addressed in the context of valued
judge functions is that of the trial judge as allocator of decision
4 In the commercial law context, parties are presumed to have the capacity to
bargain on their own behalf and to agree to private contractual arrangements governing
their behavior vis a vis each other. Essential to such freedom of contract is a sense on
the actors' part that they know the legal consequences of their bargains. Moreover, if
their deal falls through, an understanding of the legal "back up" provisions may affect
their willingness to bargain at all.
See, e.g., Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv.
L. REv 1281 (1976); Peckham, The Federal Judge as Case Manager: The New Role in
Guiding a Case From Filing to Disposition, 69 CALin. L. Rav 770 (1981); Resnik,
Managerial Judges, 96 HARv L. REv 374 (1982).
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making responsibility If the functional model is to be explored
further, certain behavioral assumptions regarding the judge must
be made. The discussion that follows assumes that the judge
behaves in a way that promotes rational, efficient decision mak-
ing, and that motives such as distrust of the jury, impatience
with delay, or ego do not enter into decisions allocating respon-
sibility between the judge and jury Obviously, how and why
judges decide as they do are fertile questions for study 489
C. Jury Control Devices and the Functional Model
This Article sets out two different types of jury control
devices. The first, epitomized by the special verdict device, rep-
resents an attempt to control the jury's decision-making process
by structuring it in a way that avoids pitfalls or perceived abuses.
The second type of control device takes decision making away
from the jury upon the judge's determination that insufficient
evidence exists to allow the jury to make a decision or to allow
a decision the jury has already made to stand. Representative of
this latter type of control device are the directed verdict, JNOV,
and new trial motions. This Article assesses these two broad
categories in light of the judge/jury allocation of functions set
out previously to determine the extent that such control devices
are justified.
1. Controlling Decision Making: The Special Verdict
The special verdict of Rule 49(a) allows the judge, in collab-
oration with the attorneys in the case, to isolate certain material
issues in the case for jury determination. By isolating these issues
of fact, the jury can do what it does best: apply its common
life experiences in evaluating the evidence and deciding what
happened. The judge in this scenario takes the jury's factual
conclusions and applies his or her expertise to determine the law
411 An empirical study could correlate various factors with a judge's use of control
devices. For example, one could test the relationship between a serious backlog and the
judge's decision to take cases away from the jury. In addition, research is necessary
concermng the impact of the trial judge's managerial functions upon the judge's ability
to act as a rational, impartial decision maker. See, Resnik, supra note 488, at 424-45.
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and to apply it in a uniform way The special verdict enhances
the judge's ability to structure the case so as to isolate the jury's
principal function. The special verdict also enhances the judge's
ability to ensure that the verdict is rational and is not based
upon improper motive, although highly motivated and biased
jurors may circumvent this feature of the special verdict.
The functional model works well to clarify the purposes
being served by a device such as the special verdict. The judge's
supervisory function is apparently well served in that he or she
is able to structure the case in such a way that the jury's
traditional fact-finding function is preserved, and the rationality
of adjudicatory process is enhanced. Of course, the jury may
lack special competency regarding common, everyday factual
determinations, and therefore the real rationale may be a resort
to the public acceptance function. In this regard the special
verdict may not appear as- valuable as the general verdict since
the very purpose of the device is to eliminate some of the
obscurity of the general verdict. However, the special verdict
does serve the public acceptance function as well. The judge's
application of the law is usually routine. The jury decides what
happened; the judge merely characterizes that decision in legal
terms. Thus, to the extent that public acceptance is a function
of verdicts representing the jury's conclusion that the defendant
did the acts proscribed by law (and thus the law will "punish"
him or her), the special verdict as well as general verdict may
serve that function. In addition, once the court decides that it
has no special competency to make such determinations and that
no strong policy supports taking the case away from the jury,
then the fact that the jury trial is a constitutional right, while
the judge trial is not, should dictate deference to the jury
There remains the question of the extent to which the special
verdict impairs the jury's equity function and the weight to be
accorded such an impairment. The general verdict is the vehicle
by which the jury does its equitable work; by separating the
specific factual determinations from the application of the law,
the jury's power to nullify unjust results is precluded. Neverthe-
less, assuming that juries who answer special verdict questions
are unaware of the consequences of their answers and are un-
willing to bend the factual determinations to reach their intended
result is probably unrealistic. Moreover, jury nullification power
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may have societal value only in a very narrow range of cases,
principally criminal cases and civil cases that raise grave issues
of social concern. Perhaps identifying those cases is a first step
to defining appropriate cases for the special verdict.
In the vast majority of civil cases, the balance between
justifying the special verdict or not should be struck in favor of
the control device. The device promotes the valued judge func-
tions relating to uniformity of result, expertise, management of
the process, and ensuring a rational adjudicatory process and
promotes the valued jury functions of fact finding in the interest
of public acceptance. In this balancing, only the jury's equity
function is not promoted, but one may assign slight weight to
that function in the usual civil case.
2. Control Devices Based on Sufficiency Questions: Taking
the Case from the Jury
The directed verdict and JNOV create the most difficulties
in justifying jury control under any of the traditional models. It
may be argued that by wholly abrogating the jury's role in the
adjudicatory process, these devices do not promote any of the
valued jury functions, but that argument takes a narrow view
of the process. It can also be argued that such devices reinforce
the respective functions of judges and juries by making clear the
situations in which those functions are properly exercised. Thus,
certain factual determinations are left to juries not because of
any special competency they have in deciding those facts, but
rather because their verdicts in such cases serve a social function.
In certain cases no need may exist for the jury to serve that
function. Cases in which the judge determines that only one
result is possible may be the cases in which jury intervention is
not necessary to preserve public acceptance of the verdict.
Elimination of juries in certain cases might suggest a disre-
gard of the constitutional limits the Supreme Court has ex-
pressed. Let no misunderstanding exist regarding this proposal.
Traditional formulation of the directed verdict standard requires
that the court determine that insufficient facts exist upon which
a jury could find for the party moved against. What is being
proposed is a recogmtion that leaving the decision to the jury
when "sufficient" evidence exists is not premised upon a clear
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choice of the jury as an especially competent decision maker.
Thus, the standard does not change under the functional model
but only the rationale for that standard. When jury fact finding
serves no function, then the interest in having the jury perform
such fact finding is weak.
The difficulty commentators have in explaining these devices
under the existing models lies in the apparent functioning of the
court as a fact finder in the jury's stead. With the new trial
motion granted on the basis that the verdict is against the weight
of the evidence, arguing that the judge's role is otherwise is
difficult. Viewed functionally, however, the judge's role in grant-
ing a directed verdict or JNOV is different from that of the
jury The judge applies a standard of law, meant to apply in
the long term. That standard regulates the burden of producing
evidence. Consistent levels of proof arguably serve the rational
decision-making process because they remove decisions from the
jury's province that are insufficiently supported by rational proof.
Implicit in the court's decision to grant a directed verdict or
a JNOV is the notion that for the jury to reach any other
decision would require an improper bias or prejudice. The de-
vices promote the judge's function to determine the law appli-
cable to the merits of the case and the standard that determines
in a uniform way when reasonable minds could not differ In
addition, the judge's expertise in dealing with similar situations
over a period of time is called upon. The strong emphasis on
valued judge functions and the relatively weak jury interests in
nonapplication of the judge's power also favor the justification
of these devices.
The new trial motion on its face represents a direct conflict
between the functions of the judge and the jury While allowing
the judge to take the case away from the jury when the jury's
decision is against the weight of the evidence promotes the
judge's function of ensuring that verdicts are based upon rational
decision making, a new trial grant conflicts with the traditional
view of the jury's function of rendering specific factual deter-
minations. Moreover, to the extent that the jury's verdict is
evidence of its equity function, the judge's decision to grant a
new trial abrogates that function.
The explanation for the view that thrs device has caused little
concern among courts and commentators is consistent with the
[VOL. 76
CONTROLLING THE CIVIL JURY
functional model. First, in functional terms, the judge deter-
mines that jury fact finding was not a rational process and,
therefore, should not stand. In addition, the jury's decision
against the weight of the evidence is contrary to the notion of
gaining public acceptance for verdicts. Lastly, the jury's func-
tions are not abrogated; rather, they are deferred to a second
trial in which the parties are free to prove their cases. Therefore,
granting a new trial represents a validation of the function of
the jury trial.
The functional model explains the use of the new trial grant
rather than the directed verdict or the JNOV Under existing
models justifying jury control, once the judge determines that
insufficient evidence exists under the directed verdict test, the
judge has discretion to make use of any of the sufficiency-of-
the-evidence devices. None of those models illuminates that choice
for the trial judge; however, the functional model clarifies the
appropriate situation in which to use one or the other of the
devices. If the judge determines that the jury decision serves no
function and that the result is clearly dictated, then the directed
verdict or JNOV is appropriate since changing the jury would
not change the judge's conclusion. On the other hand, when the
judge decides that a particular jury engaged in irrational decision
making and that another jury might serve valued functions, the
judge should grant a new trial.
CONCLUSION
The historical, political, and legal models that justify the
control of the civil jury fail to provide a clear analytical frame-
work to discuss issues concerning the appropriate use and the
limitations upon control devices. Framing the justification in
functional terms provides the basis for discussing these control
issues in a context amenable to further development. As research
progresses into the actual, as opposed to the perceived, value of
the respective functions of the judge and the jury, balancing
those functions will promote theorizing about the extent to which
control of the civil jury is appropriate.
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